This paper explores the effect of discretion in estate valuation techniques on the effective estate tax burden on different asset classes. For some assets, such as liquid securities, there is relatively little discretion in valuation. For other assets, such as partial interests in closely-held businesses, family limited partnerships, and real assets or collectibles that are traded in thin markets, estate valuations may be more difficult to establish. Estate tax filers may therefore be able to select valuations that reduce the reported value of the estate assets, and therefore the effective estate tax burden. In 1998, estates that invoked the doctrine of "minority discounts" in valuing non-controlling interests in limited partnerships claimed an average discount of 36 percent for these assets, relative to their estimated market value. More than half of all limited partnership assets reported on estate tax returns were valued using this doctrine. This suggests that for a given statutory estate tax rate, the effective estate tax burden may be greater on assets that are easily valued than on difficult-tovalue assets. A comparison of the mix of assets reported on estate tax returns, and the mix the estate tax returns would be predicted to hold, given data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, is consistent with lower relative valuations for difficult-to-value assets.

Changes in the capital gains tax rules facing individual investors do not affect the incentives for “window dressing” by institutional investors, but they can affect the incentives for year‐end tax–induced trading by individual investors. Empirical evidence for the 1963 to 1996 period suggests that when the tax law encouraged taxable investors who accrued losses early in the year to realize their losses before year‐end, the correlation between early year losses and turn‐of‐the‐year returns was weaker than when the law did not provide such an early realization incentive. These findings suggest that tax‐loss trading contributes to turn‐of‐the‐year return patterns.

This paper provides new evidence on how wealth shocks influence retirement behavior. Economic theory generally posits that leisure is a normal good, yet it is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply. We use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement, especially when the inheritance is unexpected. This evidence has important implications for how public policies, such as pension or tax reform, may influence retirement behavior through the wealth effect.

This paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan, focusing on individuals’ decision-making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics. Analyses of a survey of plan participants show that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default. This paper also explores an important implication of defaulting—individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan. The desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision-making characteristics, including procrastination.

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.

Endowment payouts have become an increasingly important component of universities' revenues in recent decades. We study how universities respond to financial shocks to endowments and thus shed light on a number of existing models of endowment behavior. Endowments actively reduce payouts relative to their stated payout policies following negative, but not positive, shocks. This asymmetric behavior is consistent with “endowment hoarding,” especially among endowments whose current value is close to the benchmark value at the start of the university president's tenure. We also document the effect of negative endowment shocks on university operations, such as personnel cuts.