We document potential cross-sectional differences in how expected loss accounting will affect provision timeliness to provide important policy insights and contribute to the literature regarding the estimation of the expected loss model adoption impact and provision timeliness determinants. Our findings that analyst provision forecasts incrementally predict future nonperforming loans (NPLs) and market returns suggest that the incurred loss provision does not incorporate all available future loss information. Higher incremental coefficients on provision forecasts for banks with greater unrecognized future losses and incurred loss constraints suggest CECL could affect cross-sectional provision timeliness differences by removing these constraints. Specifically, the provision forecast and future NPL association increases with banks' unconstrained future loss estimates reflected in loan fair value disclosures and incurred loss constraints indicated by heterogeneous loans individually reviewed for impairment. This association also increases with EPS forecast errors, but decreases with target price and NPL forecast errors.

We examine whether bank connections via common mutual fund ownership serve as a contagion channel affecting the systemic risk of the banking system. Examining this relation is important because common mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, and a buildup of systemic risk was at the heart of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We predict and document that the extent of a bank's connection with other banks via common ownership increases its contribution to systemic risk. We further predict and find that this association is primarily driven by passive mutual funds. We provide evidence that common passive ownership results in higher systemic risk through two mechanisms: nondiscretionary sell‐offs of bank stocks and a common pattern of voting. Our results are also robust to two alternate instrumental variable analyses. This study contributes to the literature by documenting an unintended, macro‐level consequence of common mutual fund ownership. Our findings broaden the understanding of common ownership as one mechanism through which systemic risk materializes and should be particularly relevant for regulators who seek to prevent future systemic failures.