We find robust empirical evidence that firms in locations with higher exposure to climate change pay significantly higher spreads on their bank loans. To alleviate the concerns related to using firms' headquarters in determining climate risk exposure, we exploit the economic link between a firm and its customers and find that the exposure of a firm's customers to climate risk also adversely affects that firm's cost of borrowing. In the cross-section, we find that the long-term loans of poorly rated firms drive the effect. Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders increasingly view climate change as a relevant risk factor.

We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.