We present evidence that loan allocations and loan terms are closely linked to the strength of social connections between bank and borrower regions. Lending increases with social connectedness, particularly in the presence of strong screening incentives. If connectedness is high, banks discriminate between borrowers more, the terms of originated loans are more borrower friendly, and loan performance is better. Furthermore, social connectedness is associated with higher bank profitability and with lending-related increases in borrower-region GDP growth and employment. Our results suggest that lending barriers decrease with social connectedness, which helps our understanding of geographic lending patterns and regional economic disparities.

We analyze the relationship between asset price bubbles and systemic risk, using bank-level data covering almost 30 years. Banks’ systemic risk already rises during a bubble’s buildup and even more so during its bust. The increase in risk strongly differs across banks and by bubble. It depends on bank characteristics (especially bank size) and bubble characteristics and can become very large: in a median real estate bust, systemic risk increases by almost 70% of the median for banks with unfavorable characteristics. These results emphasize the importance of bank-level factors in the buildup of financial fragility during bubble episodes.