Does the retail clientele matter for option returns? By delta-hedging options and trading straddles, thus allowing a focus on volatility, this paper empirically shows that a higher retail trading proportion (RTP) is related to lower option returns. Long-short portfolios involving options on low and high RTP stocks generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The results suggest that retail investors speculate and pay a lottery premium on the expected future volatility, resulting in more expensive options with higher implied volatilities.

We establish the existence of liquidity risk premium in option returns via sorting analyses and Fama-MacBeth regressions. In leverage-adjusted, hedged returns, the alpha due to liquidity risk ranges from 8.5 to 14.6 basis points per month. In hedged returns unadjusted for leverage, the alpha ranges from 165.9 to 185.1 basis points per month. Compared with the option bid-ask spread, the premium is small in magnitude. In contrast to the findings for stocks and bonds, the liquidity risk premium uncovered in option returns is negative. We explain the negative premium by noting that option end-users write options in net and they might care more about liquidity risk than market makers.

This paper investigates the motive of option trading. We show that option trading is mostly driven by differences of opinion, a finding different from the current literature that attempts to attribute option trading to information asymmetry. Our conclusion is based on three pieces of empirical evidence. First, option trading around earnings announcements is speculative in nature and mostly dominated by small, retail investors. Second, around earnings announcements, the pre-announcement abnormal turnovers of options seem to predict the post-announcement abnormal stock returns. However, once we control for the pre-announcement stock returns, the predictability completely disappears, implying that option traders simply take cues from the stock market and turn around to speculate in the options market. Third, cross-section and time-series regressions reveal that option trading is also significantly explained by differences of opinion. While informed trading is present in stocks, it is not detected in options.

On October 11, 2011, a non-governmental organization called ActionAid published a report condemning the FTSE 100 firms for holding an unusually large number of subsidiaries in tax havens. Urging the government to implement appropriate actions, the report raised the firms' costs of holding tax haven subsidiaries. After this event, the stock prices of the nonfinancial firms experienced a 0.9% abnormal drop (corresponding to about £9billion in market capitalization). Those better-governed firms and those with larger shares of subsidiaries in tax havens experienced larger drops. We find some evidence that government scrutiny, reputation, and investor sentiment were plausible channels of such a negative impact.

The existing literature attributes the recent decay of stock market anomalies to increased arbitrage activities (e.g., Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2014; McLean and Pontiff, 2016; Green, Hand, and Zhang, 2017). In this paper, we present evidence that the apparent demise of several prominent classes of stock market anomalies is better explained by changes in underlying fundamentals. The attenuation of anomalies in the Momentum, Investment, and Profitability categories are accompanied by a reduced difference in fundamental performance between the long- and short-leg portfolios, as measured by the fundamental return from a two-capital investment CAPM. After accounting for the change in fundamental return, the attenuation of Investment and Profitability anomalies decreases to statistically insignificant levels. These results are consistent with the q-theory of investment, which attributes the attenuation of stock returns and fundamental returns of anomalies to the time variation in discount rates implied by fundamentals. We also show that neither academic publication nor proxies for increased arbitrage activities can explain the attenuation of these anomalies.

The cash conversion cycle (CCC) is important for fundamental analysis as an indicator of management effectiveness in cash and financing. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence for its implications on asset pricing except for the very recent findings that high CCCs negatively predict stock returns in the U.S. By investigating 47 developed and emerging markets from 1993 to 2018, we find a mild CCC effect across the globe. The Low-minus-High equal-weighted hedge portfolios sorted by components of CCC yield significant Fama-French five-factor alphas ranging from 0.277 to 0.730% per month. Our results are consistent with a mispricing explanation by analyzing earnings prediction, announcement returns around future earnings, and limits of arbitrage although there is also some evidence for a risk-based explanation. Moreover, the CCC effect is stronger in emerging markets than developed markets and for markets with more political risk and less integrated with the global market.

Seasonal fluctuations in a firm’s business activities can affect its balance sheet and give rise to seasonally predictable accruals. We find that seasonal patterns in accruals are associated with future stock returns. Specifically, we find that firms with historically lower (higher) accruals in a given fiscal quarter have higher (lower) stock returns in the months when those accruals are expected to be announced. Our results suggest that investors do not fully understand and price historical information on accruals seasonality. Additional analyses suggest that the emergence of this accruals seasonality anomaly is concentrated in the post-2001 period and driven by the effects of unsophisticated arbitrage against the accruals anomaly.