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Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships.
Customer relationships arise between banks and firms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers; competition, thus, drives banks to lend to new firms at interest rates that initially generate expected losses. As a result, the allocation of capital is shifted toward lower quality and inexperienced firms. This inefficiency is eliminated if complete contingent contracts are written or, when this is costly, if banks can make nonbinding commitments that, in equilibrium, are backed by reputation.
Animal Spirits, Margin Requirements, and Stock Price Volatility.
A simple overlapping generations model is used to characterize the effects of initial margin requirements in the volatility of risky asset prices. Investors are assumed to exhibit heterogenous preferences for risk-bearing, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. This framework is used to show that imposing a binding initial marginal requirement may either increase or decrease stock price volatility, depending upon the microeconomic structure behind fluctuations in economywide average risk-bearing propensity. The ambiguous effect on volatility similarly arises when the source of heterogeneity is noise trader beliefs.
Reexamining Stock Valuation and Inflation: The Implications Of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts
This paper examines the effect of inflation on stock valuations and expected long-run returns. Ex ante estimates of expected long-run returns are constructed by incorporating analysts' earnings forecasts into a variant of the Campbell-Shiller dividend-price ratio model. The negative relation between equity valuations and expected inflation is found to be the result of two effects: a rise in expected inflation coincides with both lower expected real earnings growth and higher required real returns. The earnings channel mostly reflects a negative relation between expected long-term earnings growth and expected inflation. The effect of expected inflation on required (long-run) real stock returns is also substantial. An increase of one percentage point in expected inflation is estimated to raise required real stock returns about one percentage point, which on average would imply a 20% decline in stock prices. But the inflation factor in expected real stock returns is also in long-term Treasury yields; consequently, expected inflation has little effect on the long-run equity premium.
Credit rationing, concessionary lending, and debt maturity
Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting
This paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private-market corporate lending, adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature. Comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies, we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information-problematic firms. However, finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers, particularly more leveraged borrowers. Evidence supports both regulatory and reputation-based explanations for this specialization. In passing, we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies.
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships
Customer relationships arise between banks and firms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers; competition thus drives banks to lend to new firms at interest rates which initially generate expected losses. As a result, the allocation of capital is shifted toward lower quality and inexperienced firms. This inefficiency is eliminated if complete contingent contracts are written or, when this is costly, if banks can make nonbinding commitments that, in equilibrium, are backed by reputation.
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships
Anchoring Bias in Consensus Forecasts and Its Effect on Market Prices
Previous empirical studies on the “rationality” of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors but provide only limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. This paper tests for a specific form of forecast bias. In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Such a bias would be consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) or could arise from professional forecasters’ strategic incentives. We find broad-based and significant evidence for this form of bias, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. To investigate whether market participants’ expectations are influenced by this bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the forecast error and not to the component induced by anchoring, suggesting that expectations of market participants anticipate this bias embedded in expert forecasts.
Capital market imperfections and the incentive to lease
This paper evaluates the influence of financial contracting costs on public corporations' incentives to lease fixed capital. We argue that firms facing high costs of external funds can economize on the cost of funding by leasing. We construct several measures of leasing propensity, plus some a priori indicators of the severity of financial constraints facing firms. We find that the share of total annual fixed capital costs attributable to either capital or operating leases is substantially higher at lower-rated, non-dividend-paying, cash-poor firms — those likely to face relatively high premiums for external funds.