Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.

Comparing banks to non-bank lenders, we investigate whether the geographical distance between lenders, borrowers, and their properties is reflected in the pricing of US mortgages that were included in US commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) pools during the 2000 to 2017 period. The difference in loan spreads when the bank-borrower distance increases from zero to the median of about 700 miles is 10 basis points, and this effect is more pronounced if the loan is collateralized by a riskier property. On the contrary, geographical distance does not seem to have any effect on the loan spread of mortgages granted by non-bank lenders. The difference in loan pricing across originator types (even after controlling for key mortgage and property characteristics) suggests that banks and non-bank lenders have different incentives, lending technologies, and/or different types of borrowers. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on non-bank lender behavior.

We hypothesize that financial risk-taking originates in preindustrial interpersonal population diversity. We use data on immigrants residing in the United States and show that controlling for all known determinants of portfolio decisions and more than 100 control variables, diversity in the country of immigrants’ origin positively affects stock market participation and the level of risky asset holdings. Our results remain robust when instrumenting diversity with plant variety. We also identify the channels through which the effect of diversity operates (mostly individualism and human capital), but also conclude that diversity exerts an independent effect.

The internal ratings-based (IRB) approach maps banks' risk profiles more adequately than the standardized approach. After switching to IRB, banks' risk-weighted asset (RWA) densities are thus expected to diverge, especially across countries with different supervisory strictness and risk levels. However, when examining 52 listed banks headquartered in 14 European countries that adopted the IRB approach, we observe a convergence of their RWA densities over time. We test if this convergence can be entirely explained by differences in the size of the banks, loss levels, country risk, and/or time of IRB implementation, yet this is not the case. Whereas banks in high-risk countries, with lax regulation, reduce their RWA densities, banks elsewhere increase theirs. Especially for banks in high-risk countries, RWA densities underestimate banks' actual economic risk. Hence, the IRB approach allows for regulatory arbitrage, whereby authorities only enforce strict supervision on capital requirements if they do not jeopardize bank viability.