Current cost income, Dividends, Historical Cost income, Informational content

Theoretical economic models, official labor force statistics, and most empirical studies of young workers disregard employment experience of students under age 16. Evidence from several sources, however, suggests that students ages 14 and 15 acquire substantial employment experience. Moreover, that experience is vastly different for black and white youths. Several policy-related issues, including causes of black-white differences in adult earnings, may deserve to be interpreted differently in the light of differentials in early employment experience. This employment experience of 14- and 15-year-olds in general and its racial pattern in particular should not continue to be ignored.

With the formation of a formal market for the trading of financial futures in October 1975, a renewed interest in the futures contract as an investment vehicle has emerged. The traditional approach was to view investing in futures as a way of off setting potential price risk associated with a given spot position. While these descriptive scenarios (see [3], [6], [10], [12], [13], [14], and [19]) adequately illustrate the traditional hedging strategy, their simplifying assumptions introduce a lack of realism into the investment process. The implication drawn from many of these articles is that, if one is interested in risk reduction, one should simply take the opposite position in the appropriate number of futures contracts to totally offset one's existing spot position.

Accounting Research, Cross-correlated returns, Industry concentration, GLS

There is an interesting unexplored sideline to the empirical literature on compensating wage differentials (CDs) for hazardous work. Every study of differences between union and nonunion compensation for exposure to deadly hazards has found that union members receive much larger CDs than nonunion workers.' Further, in many of these studies negative CDs are found and some are statistically significantly negative. Some have interpreted these results as indicating the possible existence of substantial market failure. Despite this, there has been almost no discussion of the implications of such a conclusion for occupational safety and health policy. In contrast, several authors, ignoring the union-nonunion differences, have suggested that the empirical evidence on risk premiums supports the argument that markets efficiently allocate occupational risk without government intervention. (See, for example, Robert Smith, 1982, pp. 327, 336.) The analysis presented below shows that a market failure argument is not needed to explain the finding that union workers receive larger CDs than nonunion workers. Efficient contracts may provide workers with either larger or smaller CDs than a competitive market would. But, negative CDs cannot be reconciled with efficient markets given any reasonable assumptions about workers' preferences. The analysis also considers several potential statistical explanations for these findings. Results are mixed and the conclusion considers the policy implications.