Prior studies on the firm size effect either do not adequately control for earnings or ignore the potential implication of earnings news for the firm size effect. Thus, they implicitly assume that the firm size effect is identical across all firms irrespective of earnings news. This study provides additional empirical evidence on the firm size effect by taking earnings news into account. The results indicate that the firm size effect persists even when earnings news, measured by the sign and magnitude of unexpected earnings, is controlled. The firm size effect, however, is pronounced only for firms with “good” earnings news, but not for firms with “bad” earnings news. Possible implications of these findings are explored. Résumé. Les études qui ont été réalisées jusqu'à maintenant sur l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise ne contrôlent pas adéquatement la variable bénéfices ou ignorent les conséquences potentielles de l'information relative aux bénéfices sur l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise. Elles supposent donc implicitement que l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise est la même pour toutes les entreprises, peu importe l'information relative aux bénéfices. La présente étude ajoute aux preuves empiriques concernant l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise, en tenant compte de l'inforrmation relative aux bénéfices. Les résultats de cette étude révèlent que l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise persiste, même lorsque l'information relative aux bénéfices, mesurée en fonction de l'indication de bénéfices imprévus et de leur ampleur, est contrôlée. L'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise est toutefois marquée seulement dans le cas des entreprises pour lesquelles l'information relative aux bénéfices est « positive », et non dans le cas des entreprises pour lesquelles l'information relative aux bénéfices est « négative ». L'auteur explore les conséquences possibles des résultats de l'étude.

This article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance. Production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity; positive effects, where they exist, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process. Lower profitability among unionized firms is well established; more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long-lived tangible and intangible capital. The connection between unions, investment behavior, and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry, although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism's long-run impact.

[When a firm is in financial distress, in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist. This article shows that the bankruptcy code, by providing rules governing the negotiation process, yields a unique solution to the reorganization process. In addition, the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant's divergent incentives.]

When a firm is in financial distress, in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist. This article shows that the bankruptcy code, by providing rules governing the negotiation process, yields a unique solution to the reorganization process. In addition, the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant's divergent incentives.

An alternative approach to the measurement of horizontal inequality is developed. This measure of inequality is based on an explicit social welfare function which is formulated so as to be consistent with the basic principles of social choice. The arguments of the social welfare function are welfare functions that depend on prices, total expenditure and the demographic composition of the household. The level of horizontal inequality is defined to be the difference between the level of social welfare attained at a perfect horizontally egalitarian distribution of welfare and the level of social welfare attained at the existing distribution of individual welfare. The level of horizontal inequality induced by the introduction of commodity taxes is evaluated for the United States over the period 1947-85.

Specific egalitarianism calls for the equalization in the consumption of specific commodities and is a guiding principle of redistributional policy in the United States. It is therefore of interest to evaluate the impact of specific egalitarianism on general egalitarian measures of inequality. For this purpose, multidimensional measures of welfare inequality are disaggregated into subindexes of inequality defined over the distributions of components of individual welfare. The welfare components are taken to be subutility functions identified through the two stage budgeting process. The effect of eliminating inequality in the distribution of a specific welfare component on total welfare inequality is examined for the United States.

Reviews the book "Accounting for Data Processing Costs," by Robert W. McGee.

In this study we explore implications of extant trading volume theories for empirical information content studies. Using a simple general equilibrium model, we analyze and illustrate how trading volume reacts to information conveyed by an event. We show that a trading volume reaction to the release of an informational event is an increasing function of dispersion in belief changes among investors caused by information in the event, rather than belief changes per se. We also show that because of a possibility of no significant price change, a price effect study alone is not sufficient to accurately assess the information content of an event and a simultaneous volume effect study is necessary. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient les conséquences des théories existantes relatives au volume de titres négociés sur les études à contenu informationnel empirique. À l'aide d'un simple modèle d'équilibre général, ils analysent et illustrent comment le volume de titres négociés réagit à l'information transmise par un événement. Leur étude révèle que le volume de titres négociés par suite de la publication d'un événement informationnel croît en fonction de la dispersion dans les changements d'attitude chez les investisseurs attribuables à l'information que livre l'événement, plutôt qu'en fonction des changements d'attitude eux‐mêmes. Elle démontre également qu'en raison de la possibilité qu'il n'y ait aucun changement de prix important, l'étude du comportement des prix risque de ne pas suffire à elle seule à évaluer avec précision le contenu informationnel d'un événement, et qu'une étude simultanée du comportement du volume de titres négociés s'impose.