This paper applies a recursive model of structure-entry-performance with structural feedbacks to sixty-two Korean manufacturing industries for 1976-81. The results strongly support the market power hypothesis. The results also indicate that, despite active government intervention, the invisible hand is working: structure is evolving as expected with high profits leading to entry and consequently lower profits. However, there is little support for limit pricing hypotheses in this explosively growing economy.

Most asset pricing models postulate a positive relationship between a stock portfolio's expected returns and risk, which is often modeled by the variance of the asset price. This paper uses GARCH in mean models to examine the relationship between mean returns on a stock portfolio and its conditional variance or standard deviation. After estimating a variety of models from daily and monthly portfolio return data, we conclude that any relationship between mean returns and own variance or standard deviation is weak. The results suggest that investors consider some other risk measure to be more important than the variance of portfolio returns.

Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur la question du portefeuille d'un vérificateur qui contrôle le volume de travail de vérification qu'il accepte et combine ensuite ses placements sur le marché boursier en général à ses placements dans des missions de vérification présentant un risque. Il est impossible pour le vérificateur, font‐ils remarquer, de sélectionner les missions de vérification qu'il désire incorporer à son portefeuille; un portefeuille se constitue plutôt indirectement, par l'intermédiaire d'un processus d'offres de service concurrentielles. L'analyse qui suit permet donc de formuler une fonction d'offre gráce à laquelle il est possible d'estimer les honoraires minimums que le vérificateur est disposé à accepter pour dispenser ses services à un nouveau client potentiel, étant donné ses placements existants. Les auteurs énoncent des propositions relatives aux conséquences de diverses caractéristiques du portefeuille sur les honoraires demandés. Enfin, ils traitent de l'incidence possible du risque lié à la vérification, envisagé dans l'optique du portefeuille, sur la structure du secteur de la vérification.

This paper examines the portfolio problem of an auditor who controls the level of audit quantity and then combines investments in general market securities with investments in risky audits. We note that an auditor cannot simply choose audits to add to the portfolio but, rather, that a portfolio is constructed indirectly through a process of bidding against competitors. Thus, our analysis yields a bidding function that provides an estimate of the minimum fee an auditor is willing to accept to serve a potential new client, given existing investments. We develop propositions concerning the effects of various portfolio characteristics on the fee bid. Finally, we discuss the possible impact of a portfolio view of audit risk upon the structure of the auditing industry.

Reviews the book `An Analytical Framework for Accounting Theory,' by Stanley C.W. Salvary.