Financial institutions are financed by both investors and customers. Investors expect an appropriate risk-adjusted return for providing financing and risk bearing. Customers, in contrast, provide financing in exchange for specific services, and want the service fulfillment to be free of the intermediary's credit risk. We develop a framework that defines the roles of customers and investors in intermediaries, and use it to build an economic theory that has the following main findings. First, with positive net social surplus in the intermediary-customer relationship, the efficient (first best) contract completely insulates the customer from the intermediary's credit risk, thereby exposing the customer only to the risk inherent in the contract terms. Second, when intermediaries face financing frictions, the second-best contract may expose the customer to some intermediary credit risk, generating “customer contract fulfillment” costs. Third, the efficiency loss associated with these costs in the second best rationalizes government guarantees like deposit insurance even when there is no threat of bank runs. We further discuss the implications of this customer-investor nexus for numerous issues related to the design of contracts between financial intermediaries and their customers, the sharing of risks between them, ex ante efficient institutional design, regulatory practices, and the evolving boundaries between banks and financial markets.

We assemble a new, quarterly panel dataset that links firms’ investment and financing to their employment and wages. In the data, wages and leverage are negatively related, both cross-sectionally and within firms. This pattern contradicts models in which firms insure workers against unemployment risk. We reconcile this fact with a model that integrates factor adjustment frictions and wage bargaining with costly external financing. In the model, the probability of default rises with debt. Because default incurs deadweight costs, the expected surplus over which firms and workers bargain falls, thus depressing wages. We show that raising financing costs reduces employment and wages, in line with recent reduced-form evidence.

We investigate whether tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the costs of diversion are low by comparing dividend payouts, performance, and overinvestments of tax haven firms versus other multinational firms based in countries with weak and strong investor protections. Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009a, b) and Desai et al. (2007) set forth a theory of tax avoidance within an agency framework (the D&D theory) based on the assumption that tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the corporate governance system is “ineffective” (i.e., the manager's expected costs of diversion are low). Tax haven firms are corporate groups whose parent firms are incorporated in tax haven countries that are not the countries where the groups’ headquarters or primary operations are located (i.e., their “base” countries). We argue that tax haven incorporation potentially lowers the costs of diversion for managers of firms based in countries with weak investor protections. Using a sample from 28 base countries, we provide evidence that manager diversion and tax avoidance are complementary for tax haven firms based in countries with weak investor protections but not for tax haven firms based in countries with strong investor protections. Our results are consistent with the complementarity assumption underlying the D&D model and provide additional insights into the potential impact of the decentralization of the global firm.

This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute governance mechanisms and that demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external governance mechanisms. Received May 18, 2016; editorial decision November 11, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

We document a growing disparity in earnings disclosure mechanisms. Firms are increasingly disclosing earnings announcements (EA) concurrently with the 10-K filing instead of first issuing a ‘stand-alone’ EA. Firm adoption of concurrent EA/10-Ks is associated with lower investor sophistication, greater impediments to producing timely and reliable earnings information, and greater industry-level concurrent reporting. Concurrent EA/10-Ks differ from stand-alone EAs in that investors anticipate more information in the EA, disclosures are preempted by industry peer EAs, the market reaction is muted even when controlling for EA timing, and post-earnings-announcement drift is greater.

Homes exposed to sea level rise (SLR) sell for approximately 7% less than observably equivalent unexposed properties equidistant from the beach. This discount has grown over time and is driven by sophisticated buyers and communities worried about global warming. Consistent with causal identification of long-horizon SLR costs, we find no relation between SLR exposure and rental rates and a 4% discount among properties not projected to be flooded for almost a century. Our findings contribute to the literature on the pricing of long-run risky cash flows and provide insights for optimal climate change policy.

We propose a new modeling approach for the cross section of returns. Our method, Instrumented Principal Component Analysis (IPCA), allows for latent factors and time-varying loadings by introducing observable characteristics that instrument for the unobservable dynamic loadings. If the characteristics/expected return relationship is driven by compensation for exposure to latent risk factors, IPCA will identify the corresponding latent factors. If no such factors exist, IPCA infers that the characteristic effect is compensation without risk and allocates it to an “anomaly” intercept. Studying returns and characteristics at the stock-level, we find that five IPCA factors explain the cross section of average returns significantly more accurately than existing factor models and produce characteristic-associated anomaly intercepts that are small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, among a large collection of characteristics explored in the literature, only ten are statistically significant at the 1% level in the IPCA specification and are responsible for nearly 100% of the model’s accuracy.

There has been a substantial increase, since 2004, in the number of firms that announce annual earnings before audit completion as opposed to after audit completion. In this study, we argue that earnings announced before audit completion are associated with lower financial reporting quality and investor perceptions that earnings are more likely to be overstated. Consistent with this expectation, we document that the market places more (less) weight on good (bad) earnings news for earnings announced after audit completion relative to earnings announced before audit completion. We continue to find this differential market response when we expand the returns window to include the 10‐K filing date, suggesting that the differential response is not driven by investors' temporary concerns about earnings revisions between the earnings announcement and the 10‐K filing date or by differential GAAP disclosures in the earnings announcement, as suggested in prior research. Finally, as a direct test of financial reporting quality, we show that earnings announced with a completed audit are less likely to be restated in the future, are less likely to meet or beat expectations, and are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals than those announced with an incomplete audit.