We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effects of changes in analyst coverage caused by broker closures and mergers, we find that firms avoid tax more aggressively after a reduction in analyst coverage. We further find that this effect is mainly driven by firms with higher existing tax-planning capacity (e.g., tax-haven presence), smaller initial analyst coverage, and a smaller number of peer firms. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced in industries where reputation matters more and in firms subject to less monitoring from tax authorities.

We examine the impact of financial analysts on the efficiency of firms' investment decisions. We use the accuracy and dispersion of financial analysts' earnings forecasts as proxies of analyst expertise and quality in making forecasts. We find that high quality forecast is associated with higher investment if the firm is more likely to under-invest and lower investment if the firm is more likely to over-invest, suggesting that forecast quality increases firm-level investment efficiency. We further show that such effects are stronger for the firms with higher information asymmetry and lower institutional stock ownership. The results are consistent with the notion that higher quality of analyst forecasts increases the information environment and external monitoring, which in turn increases investment efficiency.