An obstacle to using market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods is the lack of competitive equilibria (CEs). Arrow and Hahn introduced social-approximate equilibria: price vectors with “small” excess demands. We define preferences called Δ-substitutes, where social-approximate equilibria exist with good-by-good excess demand bounded by 2(Δ−1), independent of economy size. For Δ=1, CEs exist even with income effects. A Δ greater than 1 allows for richer substitutability and complementarity patterns, broadening the scope for market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods.

We study overconfidence related to financial knowledge among men and women within U.S. households, venturing beyond prior research confined to subsamples such as CEOs, retail investors, and older adults. By expanding our study to the broader U.S. population, we provide evidence that women, on average, exhibit greater overconfidence than men – a discrepancy attributable to the gender difference in financial knowledge. We find a positive association between overconfidence and both investment risk-taking and savings behavior, while it correlates inversely with prudent credit card management. Our findings emphasize the instrumental role of financial literacy in mitigating overconfidence, providing a deeper understanding of the interaction between gender, overconfidence, and financial literacy. Our results carry profound implications for policy interventions and educational strategies.

Effective board monitoring prevents entrenched managers from undertaking acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholders. It also facilitates a smooth transition during the post-acquisition phase. We examine how independent board leadership affects M&A outcomes. Controlling for many firm, board, and CEO attributes, we find that acquirers with independent board chairpersons earn significantly higher CAR around M&A announcements. The positive effects of independent board chairpersons are more pronounced in acquirers with high monitoring needs. The boards led by independent chairpersons primarily add value by selecting targets with high synergetic gains, avoiding overpaying for targets, and facilitating smooth transition in the post-acquisition phase.