It is frequently claimed that high ATM surcharges actually attract customers to the banks that impose them, particularly if they operate large ATM networks. By exploiting as “natural experiments” two events associated with the lifting of surcharge bans in Iowa and in the states that neighbor Iowa, this paper seeks to test for the implications of this phenomenon as it applies to the market shares of banking institutions and to several aspects of market structure. Consistent with predictions, results of “difference-in-difference” analyses suggest that the retail account shares of larger market participants increased relative to those of smaller competitors, market concentration increased, and the number of market competitors decreased after the lifting of surcharge bans – all relative to what would have occurred had there been no change in authority to surcharge.

This paper reports a systematic examination of the determinants of deposit-related retail banking fees using a set of survey data that is unusual for its size, specificity, and sampling properties. The analysis focuses explicitly on six different fees associated with checking accounts and automated teller machine (ATM) usage. A preliminary analysis documents that, on average, multimarket banks charge substantially higher fees than do typically smaller, single-market banks. A more detailed econometric analysis yields results consistent with predictions of recent models. In particular, it finds that the greater the presence of multimarket banks in the local market, the higher are the retail deposit fees of single-market banks (except in highly concentrated markets) and the weaker is the positive relationship between those fees and market concentration.

Traditional concerns about concentration in product markets have centered on the social loss associated with the mispricing that occurs when market power is exercised. This paper focuses on a potentially greater loss from market power—a reduction in cost efficiency brought about by the lack of market discipline in concentrated markets. We employ data from the commercial banking industry, which produces very homogeneous products in multiple markets with differing degrees of market concentration. We find the estimated efficiency cost of concentration to be several times larger than the social loss from mispricing as traditionally measured by the welfare triangle.

Berger, Allen N., and Timothy H. Hannon, The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking, this REVIEW 71 (May 1989), 291-299. Demsetz, Harold, Industry Structure, Rivalry, and Public Policy, Journal of Law and Economics 16 (Apr. 1973), 1-9. Jackson, William E. III, Market Structure and Price Adjustments: Evidence from the Banking Industry, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1989. Peltzman, Samuel, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, Journal of Law and Economics 20 (Oct. 1977), 229-263. Salinger, Michael, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Martin N. Bailey and Clifford Winston, (eds.), Brookings (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990). 5 No formal statistical tests of the differences in the estimated coefficients of CONC across subsamples were conducted. This analysis was concerned more with the sign and significance level of each subsample estimated CONC coefficient.

The commonly observed positive correlation between market concentration and profitability may be explained by noncompetitive pricing behavior, as argued by the structure-performance hypothesis, or by the greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares, as argued by the efficient-structure hypothesis. By examining the price-concentration relationship instead of the profit-concentration relationship, this paper tests the structure-performance hypothesis in a manner that excludes the efficient-structure hypothesis as an alternative explanation of the results. The results strongly support the structure-performance hypothesis and are robust with respect to model specification, measurement of concentration, and econometric technique.