Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.

We perform portfolio-level analyses to understand insurance firms’ preferred habitat behavior in the government bond market. Based on portfolio durations and portfolio weights across maturities, we find that interest rate risk exposures of insurers’ portfolios are related to their operating liabilities and financing constraints. We show that this habitat behavior significantly affects bond pricing. During the “quantitative easing” era, bond purchases by the Federal Reserve have a larger impact on the yields of Treasury bonds with a higher habitat demand.

Firms with higher asset growth rates subsequently experience lower stock returns in international equity markets, consistent with the U.S. evidence. This negative effect of asset growth on returns is stronger in more developed capital markets and markets where stocks are more efficiently priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor protection, and accounting quality. The evidence suggests that the cross-sectional relation between asset growth and stock return is more likely due to an optimal investment effect than due to overinvestment, market timing, or other forms of mispricing.

This study examines the relationship between corporate asset growth rates and bond performance, uncovering a strong inverse relationship between the two. Higher asset growth increases asset value, potentially offering greater protection to bondholders and leading to lower bond returns. By decomposing bond returns into initial yields and subsequent yield changes, our analysis supports this expectation and suggests that investors may overreact to asset growth, as investor sentiment significantly influences bond yields in response to it. Finally, drawing on insights from leverage-based Q-theory, we examine how stock returns respond to asset growth, accounting for its effect on bond performance.

Using data on both fund stockholdings and fund returns, we examine whether actively managed equity mutual funds trade on and profit from the accruals anomaly. We find that few, if any, mutual funds trade on the anomaly. The top 10% of mutual funds that have the highest portfolio weights in low‐accruals stocks have a greater, but still relatively small, exposure to low‐accruals stocks. Nonetheless, these funds make significant profit net of actual transaction costs, exhibiting an average Fama‐French three‐factor alpha of 2.83% per year. We also find that these funds are smaller, less diversified, and exhibit higher fund return volatility and higher fund flow volatility.

Previous research finds insignificant market-timing ability for mutual funds using tests based on fund returns. The return-based tests, however, are subject to the “artificial timing” bias. In this paper, we propose and implement new measures of market timing based on mutual fund holdings. Our holdings-based measures do not suffer from the artificial timing bias. We find that, on average, actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds have positive timing ability. Market timing funds use non-public information to predict market returns, tend to have high industry concentration, large fund size, a tilt toward small-cap stocks, and are active in industry rotation.

This study examines how competition affects the profitability of mutual funds’ trading on the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Our results show that among funds actively pursuing this strategy, only those that manage to avoid competition deliver superior performance. Further, we find that funds avoid competition by investing in illiquid stocks. Our analysis shows that the outperformance of these low-competition funds is mainly attributable to their information advantage in identifying mispricing among illiquid stocks.

There is a long-standing debate on whether sell-side analysts learn from their experience to improve earnings forecast skills. This study shows that incentive is an important factor for understanding the “learning by doing” effect by analysts. We examine analysts’ response to a complex type of information – corporate pension underfunding. Pension underfunding negatively impacts future earnings and analysts on average underreact to such information in their earnings forecasts. More importantly, when there is a strong incentive for analysts to deliver accurate forecasts, analyst learning effectively reduces their underreaction to pension underfunding information. On the other hand, when such an incentive is absent, the analyst learning effect is not discernible in the data. Further evidence suggests that analyst learning and incentive jointly reduce stock market mispricing associated with corporate pension underfunding.

The overwhelming majority of Chinese firms that list their stock both in China and abroad had gone public, and listed, abroad first. We find that when companies listed abroad return to China to issue stock and list, they experience poorer post-issuance stock and operating performance in comparison to purely domestic issuers. Also, they raise more funds relative to their sales, leave less money on the table for investors, and incur lower direct flotation costs. Among returning firms, those which raise higher proceeds relative to sales experience poorer long-run stock performance and lower Tobin’s q post issuance. Our results offer a new perspective on cross-listing, which we term ‘dressing-up-for-premium’. Firms from less-developed markets take advantage of the enhanced visibility and prestige associated with the foreign listing to issue shares domestically at inflated prices and favorable terms, and to raise greater proceeds than they can efficiently use.