This paper examines the innovative corporate structure of Thermo Electron Corporation which holds controlling interests in 11 units taken public in equity carve-outs. Carve-outs subject units of the company to the scrutiny of the capital markets, allow the compensation contracts of unit managers to be based on market performance, and shift capital acquisition and investment decisions from centralized control to unit managers. Thermo carve-outs substantially increase capital and R&D expenditures following carve-outs and generate significant value from their capital investments. Since the first carve-out in 1983, gains to shareholders have been substantially greater than industry and market benchmarks.

Abstract In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster. The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small unit time interval to measure these lead-lag relations comes at the cost of some or many missing observations, causing traditional estimators to either under- or overestimate covariances and correlations. We use a new estimator to estimate lead-lag relationships between the cash AEX index, options and futures. We find that futures returns lead both options and cash index returns by approximately 10 minutes. The relationship between options and the cash market is not completely unidirectional. JEL Classification: G13, G14

This study examines make or buy decisions for 196 hospitals in the United States using transaction costs as the basis for analysis. We examine the potential effects of quality and economies of scale on these decisions. We find evidence to support the view that transaction costs, quality and economies of scale play an important role in the integration decision and that this role depends on whether the transaction is industry-specific or generic in nature. This study examines the contracting choices of many firms across multiple transactions with a significantly larger data set than previous work in the area.

This paper examines empirically the effects of domicile and SEC registration and reporting requirements on information asymmetry. We compare the adverse-selection component of the relative bid–ask spread (our measure of information asymmetry) for three samples of Nasdaq NMS companies that trade in different home markets and are subject to different standards of disclosure: registered U.S. companies, registered non-Canadian foreign companies, and unregistered non-Canadian foreign companies covered by the information-supplying exemption of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We find that the adverse-selection component is not significantly larger for the two foreign samples, and it is not reliably different for the registered and unregistered foreign samples. Therefore, we are unable to document that less stringent SEC registration and reporting requirements for foreign companies are associated with greater information asymmetry among investors for non-U.S. securities traded on Nasdaq.

Michael W. Maher, M. Laurentius Marais, A Field Study on the Limitations of Activity-Based Costing When Resources are Provided on a Joint and Indivisible Basis, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 129-142

This paper examines the impact of reducing the tick size on market-making behavior on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The results indicate a significant decrease in the percentage of trades of fewer than 10,000 shares involving the upstairs traders and a significant increase in the percentage of trades of fewer than 1,000 share involving the designated market makers. Consistent with this finding, the upstairs traders earn significantly lower returns on non-block trades and the designated market markers earn lower returns on trades smaller than 1,000 shares. We conclude the tick size reduction benefits the trading public.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers, G20, G24.

Abstract We examine the 49 Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 firms that voluntarily disclosed in their 1993 proxy statements, the composition of the comparison group used by each board's compensation committee to set executive compensation policies. We hypothesize that the net benefits of this disclosure are largest when (1) there is a high degree of stakeholder concern about compensation, (2) compensation policies are defensible, and (3) corporate governance is strong. Consistent with our stakeholder concern prediction, disclosing firms have higher compensation levels and are more apt to have received prior shareholder proposals about executive compensation. Contrary to this prediction, we find a negative association between financial press coverage of compensation policies and the probability of disclosure. Additionally, the disclosure decision is unrelated to the defensibility of compensation policies and the firm's corporate governance profile. Industry‐adjusted firm performance, managerial entrenchment, CEO tenure, institutional holdings, and compensation committee independence variables are insignificant. We also compare the financial performance and compensation practices of compensation peers to two yardsticks — performance and pay practices at the sample firms and the corresponding S&P industry index firms. The compensation levels of compensation peers exceed those of the firms in the corresponding S&P industry indexes. Because (1) compensation levels and performance sensitivities at sample firms are more similar to those at compensation peers than to those at S&P industry index firms, and (2) the superior financial performance and higher performance sensitivities of disclosing firms justify high pay, this evidence suggests that the compensation peers of disclosing firms are an appropriate comparison group.

This article investigates the consequences of labor market search for the theory of hedonic wages. We find that the introduction of search has surprising consequences for the theory of hedonic wages. In particular, we demonstrate that the equilibrium distribution of wage and nonwage amenity bundles generally bears little resemblance to workers' underlying preferences. A consequence of this analysis is that estimates of workers' marginal willingness to pay, derived from the conventional hedonic wage methodology, are biased. In addition, we demonstrate that search generates differences between firm‐level and employee‐level data that can cause substantial deviations in the estimates of hedonic wage equations.