Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) raises firms' incentives to lobby policymakers to access policy information and influence policy outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that non-lobbying firms are less likely to initiate lobbying during periods of heightened EPU. The evidence is consistent with our time-varying barriers hypothesis that entry barriers to lobbying increase with EPU. We verify that the negative effect of EPU on lobbying initiation arises through the channels of lobbying entry expenses and returns to experience. Furthermore, lobbying entry expenses are not large, implying that the returns to experience channel is likely a more serious barrier preventing non-lobbying firms from initiating lobbying. We also find that facing high lobbying entry barriers, non-lobbying firms go for alternative political activities, such as hiring politically connected directors.

We investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on trade credit. We document that firms in countries that adopt IFRS receive more trade credit from their suppliers, consistent with improved financial reporting quality and comparability playing a role in facilitating informal financing. This increase is larger for countries with a low level of societal trust, a poor pre‐IFRS‐adoption information environment, and stronger legal enforcement. These cross‐sectional results suggest that the conditions under which higher‐quality information is made publicly available affect suppliers' decisions to provide trade credit. This increase is also larger for firms with greater exposure to foreign markets, a finding that highlights the importance of more comparable international financial reporting standards in facilitating cross‐country trade credit. We also find that IFRS adoption has a stronger positive effect on trade credit for firms with greater liquidity needs. Finally, we find that firms in countries that adopt IFRS also extend more trade credit to their customers. Overall, our results support the notion that financial reporting can have a causal effect on trade credit.

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) increases the cost of raising equity capital, especially when the economy is weak. A one standard deviation increase in the EPU index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) is associated with a 43 basis point increase in the price discount of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the 2000−2014 period. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the EPU effect on SEO discounts is stronger for firms with greater dependence on government spending, less informative stock price, or a smaller EPU beta. Moreover, there are fewer SEO activities in periods when there is a high degree of policy uncertainty.

We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.