"This paper considers the problem of social evaluation in a model where population size, individual lifetime utilities, lengths of life, and birth dates vary across states. In an intertemporal framework, we investigate principles for social evaluation that allow history to matter to some extent. Using an axiom called independence of the utilities of the dead, we provide a characterization of critical-level generalized utilitarian rules. As a by-product of our analysis, we show that social discounting is ruled out in an intertemporal welfarist environment. A simple population-planning example is also discussed."

This paper introduces and characterizes a new class of solutions to cooperative bargaining problems that can be rationalized by generalized Gini orderings defined on the agents' utility gains. Generalized Ginis are orderings that can be represented by quasi-concave, nondecreasing functions that are linear in rank-ordered subspaces of Euclidean space. In the case of three or more agents, the authors' characterization of (multivalued) generalized Gini bargaining solutions uses a linear invariance requirement in addition to some standard conditions. In the two-person case, the generalized Gini bargaining solutions can be characterized with a weakening of linear invariance. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.