This study examines whether the information content of earnings announcements – abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume – increases in countries following mandatory IFRS adoption, and conditions and mechanisms through which increases occur. Findings suggest information content increased in 16 countries that mandated adoption of IFRS relative to 11 that maintained domestic accounting standards, although the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption depends on the strength of legal enforcement in the adopting country. Utilizing a path analysis methodology, we find evidence of three mechanisms through which IFRS adoption increases information content: reducing reporting lag, increasing analyst following, and increasing foreign investment.

This study examines whether application of IFRS by non-US firms results in accounting amounts comparable to those resulting from application of US GAAP by US firms. IFRS firms have greater accounting system and value relevance comparability with US firms when IFRS firms apply IFRS than when they applied domestic standards. Comparability is greater for firms that adopt IFRS mandatorily, firms in common law and high enforcement countries, and in more recent years. Earnings smoothing, accrual quality, and timeliness are potential sources of the greater comparability. Although application of IFRS has enhanced financial reporting comparability with US firms, significant differences remain.

ABSTRACT This study investigates the influence of managerial incentives to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark on labor cost behavior of private Belgian firms. We posit that relative to managers of firms reporting healthy profits, managers meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark will increase labor costs to a smaller extent when activity increases and decrease labor costs to a larger extent when activity decreases. This should take the form of more symmetric labor cost behavior for firms that report a small profit. Our findings are consistent with this prediction. Using detailed employee data, we show that managers of firms reporting a small profit focus on firing employees who are relatively low cost to fire. To protect their reputation in the labor market, managers of other firms, particularly those reporting healthy profits, limit the numbers of dismissals and react to activity changes by changing the number of hours that employees work. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources referred to in the text.