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Macroeconomic perceptions, financial constraints, and anomalies

Journal of Financial Economics 2024 162, 103952
This paper studies the heterogeneous effects of subjective macroeconomic expectations on the cross-section of equity returns. We argue that an upward revision in expectations of macroeconomic productivity might be accompanied by an excessive increase in investment and external financing, inflated current equity prices, and thus lowered subsequent returns, particularly for financially constrained firms. Thus, following upward revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity, subsequent returns are relatively low for small firms, value firms, low-investment firms, risky firms, unprofitable firms, low-quality firms, and financially distressed firms—all of which are more financially constrained. In sharp contrast, following downward revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity, these categories of firms earn relatively high subsequent returns. We find that revisions in subjective macroeconomic expectations induce strong predictable time variation in a large set of anomalies. In particular, favorable revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity predict significantly stronger profitability, quality, distress, and low-risk anomalies but weaker value, investment, and size anomalies.

Equivalence of Stochastic and Deterministic Mechanisms

Econometrica 2019 87(4), 1367-1390 open access
We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.