Compensation contracts including incentive instruments not only provide executives with positive incentives to increase shareholder wealth, but also create a negative value-dilution effect for existing shareholders. This study investigates this dilemma by conducting a benefit-cost analysis under a proposed structural form valuation framework. Our design mechanism shows that, given their firms’ current capital structure, shareholders are always capable of designing an optimal compensation contract to maximize their wealth. Due to the different research issue and assumptions, unlike findings of most previous studies, our model proposes that in a firm with a higher leverage ratio shareholders should provide a contract with higher incentive intensity for managers, and this proposition is supported by the empirical analyses which examine the sample of S&P index firms over the period 1992–2006 after adopting an updated fixed effects model.

Lévy subordinated hierarchical Archimedean copulas (LSHAC) are flexible models in high dimensional modeling. However, there is limited literature discussing their applications, largely due to the challenges in estimating their structures and their parameters. In this paper, we propose a three-stage estimation procedure to determine the hierarchical structure and the parameters of a LSHAC. This is the first paper to empirically examine the modeling performances of LSHAC models using exchange traded funds. Simulation study demonstrates the reliability and robustness of the proposed estimation method in determining the optimal structure. Empirical analysis further shows that, compared to elliptical copulas, LSHACs have better fitting abilities as well as more accurate out-of-sample Value-at-Risk estimates with less parameters. In addition, from a financial risk management point of view, the LSHACs have the advantage of being very flexible in modeling the asymmetric tail dependence, providing more conservative estimations of the probabilities of extreme downward co-movements in the financial market.