Guided by the Gervais and Odean (2001) overconfident trading hypothesis, we comprehensively investigate the trading behavior of individual vs. institutional investors in Taiwan in an attempt to identify who is the more overconfident trader. Conditional on the various states of the market, on market volatility, and on the risk level of the securities they trade, we find that both individual and institutional investors trade more aggressively following market gains in bull markets, in up-market states, in up-momentum market states, and in low-volatility market states and that only individual investors trade more in riskier securities following market gains. More importantly, we find that individual investors trade more aggressively following market gains in the three conditional states of the market and in high-volatility market states than institutional investors. Also, individual investors trade more in relatively riskier securities following gains than institutional investors. These findings provide evidence that individual investors are more overconfident traders than institutional investors.

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.

Recent trends in corporate board composition indicate an increase in the appointment of directors with legal expertise. Using two financial reporting quality measures, accruals quality and discretionary accruals, we find—for a sample of Russell 1000 firms in 2003 and 2005—that the presence (and proportion) of directors with legal backgrounds on the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. These results obtain after controlling for accounting expertise on audit committees. Also, supplementary tests indicate a positive association between changes in legal expertise and changes in financial reporting quality, suggesting that legal expertise serves as a monitor rather than as a signal of financial reporting quality. Further, the two forms of expertise interact —i.e., the presence of directors with both forms of expertise enhances financial reporting quality, beyond the contribution of the individual forms of expertise. Additional tests suggest that the positive effects of legal expertise are greater in the post-SOX period compared with a pre-SOX year.