We collect and analyze detailed filings from global institutional investors to estimate foreign investors’ U.S. dollar (USD) security holdings and currency hedging. Over two decades, foreign USD holdings grew sixfold, while hedge ratios rose by 15 percentage points after the 2008–2009 crisis. Currency hedging across mutual funds, pensions, and insurance reached $2 trillion by 2019. Hedging demand varies across investors, currency areas, and banking systems. We show that expected FX returns, beyond variance minimization, drive currency exposure in portfolios. Finally, we demonstrate and quantify how aggregate hedging demand affects hedging costs in the presence of constrained intermediaries.

We provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of the currency composition of sovereign and corporate external borrowing by emerging markets from 2003 to 2017. We show that a higher reliance on foreign currency debt by the corporate sector is associated with higher sovereign default risk. We introduce local currency sovereign debt and private sector currency mismatch into a standard sovereign debt model to examine how the currency composition of corporate borrowing affects the sovereign’s incentive to inflate or default. A calibration of the model generates the empirical patterns of sovereign credit risk.

We introduce a new measure of emerging market sovereign credit risk: the local currency credit spread, defined as the spread of local currency bonds over the synthetic local currency risk‐free rate constructed using cross‐currency swaps. We find that local currency credit spreads are positive and sizable. Compared with credit spreads on foreign‐currency‐denominated debt, local currency credit spreads have lower means, lower cross‐country correlations, and lower sensitivity to global risk factors. We discuss several major sources of credit spread differentials, including positively correlated credit and currency risk, selective default, capital controls, and various financial market frictions.

We document a regime change in the Treasury market post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC): dealers switched from net short to net long Treasury bonds. We construct “net-long” and “net-short” curves that account for balance sheet and financing costs, and show that actual yields moved from the net short curve pre-GFC to the net long curve post-GFC. Our theory shows the regime shift caused negative swap spreads and co-movement among swap spreads, dealer positions, and covered-interest-parity violations. Furthermore, the effects of various monetary and regulatory policies are regime-dependent. We highlight Treasury supply as a plausible driver of this regime shift.

Violations of no-arbitrage conditions measure the shadow cost of intermediary constraints. Intermediary asset pricing and intertemporal hedging together imply that the risk of these constraints tightening is priced. We describe a “forward CIP trading strategy” that bets on CIP violations shrinking and show that its returns help identify the price of this risk. This strategy yields the highest returns for currency pairs associated with the carry trade. The strategy’s risk substantially contributes to the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, is correlated with both other near-arbitrages and intermediary wealth measures, and appears to be consistently priced across various asset classes.

We study the impact of the U.S. money market fund reform implemented in October 2016 on global banks' funding supply and business activities. We show that the reform induced a large negative wholesale funding shock for global banks. In contrast to the conventional bank lending channel, the primary response of global banks to the reform was a cutback in arbitrage positions that relied on unsecured funding, rather than a reduction in loan provision. We discuss the role of postcrisis liquidity regulations and unconventional monetary policy in explaining our findings, and implications for banks' business models and deposit competition.

We find that deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition imply large, persistent, and systematic arbitrage opportunities in one of the largest asset markets in the world. Contrary to the common view, these deviations for major currencies are not explained away by credit risk or transaction costs. They are particularly strong for forward contracts that appear on banks' balance sheets at the end of the quarter, pointing to a causal effect of banking regulation on asset prices. The CIP deviations also appear significantly correlated with other fixed income spreads and with nominal interest rates.

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk‐averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk‐averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante. This makes local currency debt too expensive from the government's perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency.