Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation reducing interstate banking restrictions between July 1982 and April 1993. For these 50 banking bills, deregulation increased the average price of bank stocks. Returns vary cross-sectionally by firm characteristics, regulatory features, and economic conditions. Returns are positively related to the characteristics of acquisition targets. Furthermore, returns are positively related to legislative features that increase the bargaining power of potential targets and economic conditions that are likely to encourage bank acquisition. These findings are consistent with the relaxation of geographic restrictions increasing activity in the corporate control market.

This paper investigates the deterioration of the banking industry's risk-control system during the 1980s and the time-varying relation between a bank's ex-ante risk-taking incentives and its ex-post risk-taking behavior over the period 1977–1994. We document that banks with high charter value imposed self-discipline on risk-taking behavior at all times. In contrast, banks with low charter value assumed significantly more risk beginning around 1983, and this behavior continued into the early 1990s. These findings have several important policy implications.