I study how increased internal control disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) affect annual corporate governance decisions regarding CFOs. Using non‐CEO, non‐COO executive officers as a control group, I find that CFOs of firms with weak internal controls receive lower compensation and experience higher forced turnover rates after the passage of SOX. In contrast, CFOs of firms with strong internal controls receive higher compensation and do not experience significant changes in forced turnover rates. These results are consistent with the “disclosure of type” hypothesis, which suggests that the mandatory internal control disclosures under SOX are a credible mechanism that effectively distinguishes good CFOs from bad ones by revealing the firm's internal control quality. The empirical evidence thus supports the notion that mandated increases in disclosure reduce information asymmetry in the executive labor market.

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de la demande inhérente que supposent les positions courtes en étudiant dans quelle mesure les réactions des cours boursiers à la publication des résultats dépendent du niveau des positions courtes. Selon leurs constatations, si les nouvelles publiées sont extrêmement positives ou extrêmement négatives, la demande inhérente entraîne à la hausse le cours des actions à proximité de la date de la publication des résultats, la hausse étant plus prononcée dans le cas des nouvelles positives que des nouvelles négatives. Plus précisément, la réaction initiale du marchéà des résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs est plus importante dans le cas d’entreprises ayant des niveaux élevés de positions à découvert. En revanche, lorsque les résultats imprévus sont extrêmement négatifs, la réaction initiale du marché est moins négative dans le cas d’entreprises dont le niveau des positions à découvert est élevé. Les auteurs constatent au surplus que l’ampleur du mouvement réactif suivant la publication des résultats est plus modeste (plus marquée) dans le cas de résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs (négatifs) pour les entreprises dont les positions à découvert sont importantes.

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post-earnings-announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.

We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by firms to deviate from the historically prevalent one-size-fits-all approach to director pay in response to increased demands on audit committees and differential director expertise.

This paper investigates how performance risk impacts a board's ability to learn about the unknown talent of a chief executive officer (CEO). We theorize that the information content of performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk and that turnover-performance-sensitivity is also increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We further investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, showing that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels decrease in the probability of turnover.