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Machine learning in corporate bonds: Evidence from China

Journal of Banking & Finance 2026 184, 107636 open access
This study employs a broad set of machine learning (ML) methods to examine cross-sectional variation in corporate bond returns in China. Using macroeconomic indicators together with bond- and issuer-specific characteristics, we find that ML techniques outperform traditional linear models in both statistical and economic terms. These models are particularly effective at capturing distinctive features of the Chinese market, including the dominance of state-owned enterprises, implicit government guarantees, and rapid market evolution. We compare long-short and long-only portfolio strategies to account for practical constraints on short selling. The results indicate that ML methods are effective in markets where institutional features and information asymmetries play a central role in asset pricing.

Regulatory punishment in an oligopolistic market: Evidence from credit rating agencies

Journal of Banking & Finance 2026 190, 107741 open access
Regulatory punishment in an oligopolistic credit rating market can be costly. Utilizing the Chinese bond market’s unique features, particularly a third-party rating agency, we investigate the regulatory suspension of Dagong Rating by Chinese regulators and its market impact. The punishment initially deters Dagong but diminishes the quality of its ratings post-punishment, altering market competition. Upon returning, Dagong inflates ratings to regain market share, reflecting a “temporary suppression” strategy. Non-Dagong agencies respond by adjusting their ratings; higher power agencies lower ratings, while lower power agencies raise them to stay competitive. Investors remain skeptical of these inflated ratings. Despite Dagong’s suspension, we find no significant differences in bond or stock price reactions between Dagong-rated and non-Dagong-rated firms, suggesting investors did not penalize Dagong-rated entities. This study highlights the complex dynamics and unintended consequences of regulatory interventions in the credit rating market.