I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854–1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.

This paper investigates banks’ reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We augment a bank-run model with the bank’s reporting choices. We show that banks with intermediate fundamentals have stronger incentive to misreport than those in the two tails. Moreover, reporting discretion reduces panic-based runs, but excessive discretion also reduces fundamental-based runs. The optimal amount of reporting discretion increases in the bank’s vulnerability to panic-based runs. Finally, a given bank’s opportunistic use of reporting discretion exerts a negative externality on other banks. Our paper answers the call by Armstrong et al. (2016) and Bushman (2016) to understand better the effects of banks’ special features on their reporting choices.

This paper examines debt maturity management through early refinancing, where firms retire their outstanding bonds before the due date and simultaneously issue new ones as replacements. Speculative-grade firms frequently refinance their corporate bonds early to extend maturity, particularly under accommodating credit supply conditions, leading to a procyclical maturity structure. In contrast, investment-grade firms do not manage their maturity in the same manner. I exploit the protection period of callable bonds to show that the maturity extension is not driven by unobservable confounding factors. The evidence is consistent with speculative-grade firms dynamically managing maturity to mitigate refinancing risk. Received June 6, 2016; editorial decision September 21, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

China's broad anti-corruption campaign includes a regulation that requires bureaucrats to resign from director positions in listed companies. Using this particular event to test the effect of the anticorruption regulation, we find that this regulation costs firms with banned directors on average 4%. This cost cannot be explained by the typical cost of losing a director or by damage from a political vendetta conducted by the leadership. We further show that the anticorruption regulation impedes firm value not only through political connections but also through the anticorruption disincentive, the incentive to act passively for fear of being accused of corruption. Finally, affected firms reduce their investments, hire more employees and have poor performance afterwards.

We investigate potential mechanisms through which market-wide sentiment affects firms’ innovation activities. We provide evidence for the financing channel by showing that financially constrained firms are more likely to issue equity and invest more in research and development (R&D) than financially unconstrained firms at high market sentiment. Using time-varying manager sentiment measures, we find suggestive evidence for a sentiment spillover channel whereby market sentiment affects R&D investments through influencing manager sentiment. Furthermore, better patent portfolios are produced from R&D investments stimulated by high market sentiment. Market sentiment has a stronger impact on R&D than the capital expenditures of financially constrained firms.

This essay presents a critical review of the recent book by Alkire et al. entitled Multidimensional Poverty Measurement and Analysis, and, in the course of doing so, it also discusses some general issues that come up in this context. We outline the basic structure of the problem of measuring multidimensional deprivation and critically evaluate the methodology adopted by Alkire et al. (2015). In particular, we discuss some problems associated with the methods used by them to identify the deprived and to aggregate individual deprivations so as to derive an index of social deprivation. We examine the interpretation in terms of unfreedoms of individuals, which Alkire et al. put on one of their measures of social deprivation. We also suggest a variant of their methodology for measuring multidimensional deprivation.

We use a multitude of tax reforms across the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries as natural experiments to estimate the market value of the tax benefits of debt financing. We report time-series evidence that tax reforms are followed by large changes in the value of corporate equity. However, the impact of tax reforms is greatly mitigated by the presence of leverage. The value of debt tax savings is greater among top taxpayers, among highly profitable firms, and in countries where tax laws are more strongly enforced. Importantly, the value of debt tax savings is in line with the benchmark implied by a traditional approach.

Some bidders voluntarily announce a merger negotiation before the definitive agreement. We propose an “announce-to-signal” explanation to these early announcements: they allow bidders to signal to target shareholders high synergies so as to overcome negotiation frictions and improve success rates. Consistent with signaling, we show that negotiation frictions predict earlier announcements. Early announced transactions are associated with higher expected synergies, offer premium, completion rates, and public competition. Moreover, bidder announcement returns do not suggest overpayment and the existence of agency issues in these transactions. Taken collectively, our findings rule out alternative explanations such as managerial learning from investors and jump bidding.

This study examines how limits of arbitrage can affect the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility. Using both unique trading constraints in the Chinese stock market and other commonly-used limits-of-arbitrage measures, we construct a comprehensive limits-of-arbitrage index. Based on this index, we find that the negative idiosyncratic volatility return premium is much stronger and more persistent in stocks with high limits of arbitrage. Furthermore, the existing explanations about the idiosyncratic volatility return premium cannot fully explain what we find about the role of limits of arbitrage in the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility in the Chinese stock market. Our study suggests that the trading constraints introduced in the name of protecting individual investors can actually hurt them, since these additional limits of arbitrage will increase the inefficiency of the security market.

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.