We document important links between targets’ institutional ownership and takeover-bid outcomes. Firms’ institutional ownership increases the likelihood of receiving stock-for-stock bids. The impact becomes stronger when information asymmetries are higher, whereas we find little support for alternative channels, such as bidder misvaluation or target-side adverse selection. The information channel is further buttressed in our analyses of institutions’ share-retention decisions, targets’ demand for top-tier advisors, collar provisions, and targets’ share of expected synergies. Our findings suggest that institutions’ information advantage facilitates rational payment design and targets’ bargaining power gains, alleviating deadweight losses associated with stock-for-stock offers.

The influence of external institutional environments on the internal functioning of business groups remains a critical yet underexplored area of research. In this paper, we focus on China's pro-market judicial reforms and examine how these reforms affect internal product and service transactions within business groups, finding that such reforms significantly reduce intra-group transactions. We further demonstrate that this decline reflects a strategic substitution toward external market transactions rather than an overall contraction in firm operations, and that the effect is not driven by managerial self-dealing but aligns with institutional voids theory. The effect is particularly pronounced in regions with underdeveloped product markets and weaker informal institutions, and in firms with lower reputations and stronger political connections. Moreover, our results hold consistently across various transaction types, whether seller- or buyer-initiated, service- or goods-related, and remain robust across alternative regression models, explanations, and regardless of the geographic proximity of group firms. These findings contribute to understanding the role of internal transactions within business groups in addressing institutional voids and add to the broader literature on how business groups emerge and adapt in response to gaps in institutional frameworks.

This paper studies the role of scale inflexibility in explaining corporate credit spreads. We find robust evidence that firms with higher inflexibility have higher credit spreads. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ a regression discontinuity design that uses the exogenous variations in labor adjustment costs resulting from close-call union elections. Furthermore, contraction inflexibility is more prominent in influencing credit spreads than expansion inflexibility is. Additionally, inflexibility increases credit spreads due to increased cash flow volatility and financial distress risk. Our findings highlight the importance of a firm’s ability to adapt to productivity shocks in fulfilling its debt obligations.

Institutional investors affected by hurricanes subsequently support environmental proposals in non-affected firms even if they never voted for similar initiatives. Affected investors raise their holdings in firms where their pro-environment votes are consequential. The increased voting support after hurricanes has real effects as environmental proposals endorsed by more hurricane-afflicted investors are more likely to pass. Moreover, both market capitalization and analysts’ recommendations decline after firms pass environmental proposals. Our evidence suggests that natural disasters raise institutional investors’ concerns about the environment and about potential fund flow disruptions. These concerns, in turn, influence environmental activism, corporate policies, and firm performance.

This paper measures China's financial resilience from the perspective of external risk shocks and analyzes its influencing factors for forecasting. First, we introduce an innovative financial resilience model comprising three submodels: the dynamic factor model, the TVP-VAR model, and a resilience characteristic measurement model that captures resistance and recoverability through absorption intensity and absorption duration. The results show a clear inverse relationship between absorption intensity and absorption duration, with resilience fluctuations exhibiting distinct phase characteristics. Notably, intervals of low resilience often correspond to specific risk events. Second, we apply the Lasso-logistic model for recursive estimation and forecasting financial resilience, while comparing its performance to that of the Logistic regression model. The results indicate that the Lasso-logistic model achieves, on average, a 10 % higher forecasting accuracy than the Logistic model does. Among the most important features identified by the model are macroeconomic and public expectation variables. The analysis shows that the stability of economic fundamentals and market participants' confidence in the future play pivotal roles in strengthening financial resilience and ensuring the stability of the financial system.

We show that occupational licensing has significant negative effects on labor market fluidity, defined as cross-occupation mobility, and positive effects on wage growth. We find that occupational licensing represents a barrier to entry for both nonemployed workers and employed ones. The effect is more prominent for employed workers than those entering from nonemployment. We also find that average wage growth is higher for licensed workers than nonlicensed workers. We find significant heterogeneity in the licensing effect across different occupation groups. These results hold across various data sources, time spans, and indicators of being licensed.

Using industry restatement contagion as an external negative shock, we study the effectiveness of enterprise risk management (ERM) in mitigating downside risk and enhancing investor confidence. We find that ERM curbs overinvestment and earnings misstatement among firms when other firms in their industry engage in undisclosed misstatements that are subsequently restated. Following the announcements of these industry restatements, peers with ERM experience a smaller increase in implied volatility skewness. These effects are driven by peers with young CEOs, complex segment structures, low prior earnings performance, and in competitive industries. Overall, our findings highlight ERM's role in bolstering investor confidence by effectively managing firms' underlying risks.

We document firms often determine CEO equity grants based on a predetermined dollar value (value-based equity grant) instead of on the number of shares (share-based grant). Value-based equity grants weaken the relationship between stock performance and CEO equity pay, lower CEO portfolio delta, and slow firms’ investment in R&D. We find that retention pressure is a key reason for the use of value-based equity pay, while governance could also matter. Overall, this paper alerts boards to the unintended consequences of pursuing a target pay level or pay structure because such practices can lead to value-based equity grants in CEO compensation.