Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.

We perform portfolio-level analyses to understand insurance firms’ preferred habitat behavior in the government bond market. Based on portfolio durations and portfolio weights across maturities, we find that interest rate risk exposures of insurers’ portfolios are related to their operating liabilities and financing constraints. We show that this habitat behavior significantly affects bond pricing. During the “quantitative easing” era, bond purchases by the Federal Reserve have a larger impact on the yields of Treasury bonds with a higher habitat demand.

We show that installing stronger risk management into financial institutions—a proposal widely discussed following the 2008 financial crisis—is insufficient to constrain institutions’ exposure to investment with lurking risk, such as asset-backed securities (ABS). Regulations affect the functioning of risk management: risk management constrains institutions’ exposure to risky ABS when they face mark-to-market reporting combined with capital requirements; however, this role is considerably weaker when capital requirements are combined with historical cost accounting. We find suggestive evidence that financial regulations affect risk management functions through promoting risk managers’ efforts in uncovering ABS risk and curbing executives’ incentives to take excessive risk.

Using data on both fund stockholdings and fund returns, we examine whether actively managed equity mutual funds trade on and profit from the accruals anomaly. We find that few, if any, mutual funds trade on the anomaly. The top 10% of mutual funds that have the highest portfolio weights in low‐accruals stocks have a greater, but still relatively small, exposure to low‐accruals stocks. Nonetheless, these funds make significant profit net of actual transaction costs, exhibiting an average Fama‐French three‐factor alpha of 2.83% per year. We also find that these funds are smaller, less diversified, and exhibit higher fund return volatility and higher fund flow volatility.

This study examines how competition affects the profitability of mutual funds’ trading on the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Our results show that among funds actively pursuing this strategy, only those that manage to avoid competition deliver superior performance. Further, we find that funds avoid competition by investing in illiquid stocks. Our analysis shows that the outperformance of these low-competition funds is mainly attributable to their information advantage in identifying mispricing among illiquid stocks.

There is a long-standing debate on whether sell-side analysts learn from their experience to improve earnings forecast skills. This study shows that incentive is an important factor for understanding the “learning by doing” effect by analysts. We examine analysts’ response to a complex type of information – corporate pension underfunding. Pension underfunding negatively impacts future earnings and analysts on average underreact to such information in their earnings forecasts. More importantly, when there is a strong incentive for analysts to deliver accurate forecasts, analyst learning effectively reduces their underreaction to pension underfunding information. On the other hand, when such an incentive is absent, the analyst learning effect is not discernible in the data. Further evidence suggests that analyst learning and incentive jointly reduce stock market mispricing associated with corporate pension underfunding.