This paper studies an optimal renegotiation protocol designed by a benevolent planner when two countries renegotiate with the same lender. The solution calls for recoveries that induce each country to default or repay, trading off the deadweight costs and the redistribution benefits of default independently of the other country. This outcome contrasts with a decentralized bargaining solution where default in one country increases the likelihood of default in the second country because recoveries are lower when both countries renegotiate. The paper suggests that policies geared at designing renegotiation processes that treat countries in isolation can prevent contagion of debt crises.

We provide a macroeconomic theory where demand for goods has a productive role. A search friction prevents perfect matching between producers and potential customers. Larger demand induces more search, which, in turn, increases GDP and measured total factor productivity (TFP). We embed the product-market friction in a standard neoclassical model and estimate it using Bayesian techniques. Business cycles are driven by preference shocks, true technology shocks, and investment-specific shocks. Preference shocks have qualitatively similar effects as true productivity shocks. These shocks account for a large share of the fluctuations in consumption, GDP, and measured TFP and can be identified using shopping time data.

This paper formalizes a classic idea that in second-best environments trade can induce welfare losses: incremental income losses from distortions can outweigh trade gains. In a Melitz model with distortionary taxes, we derive sufficient statistics for welfare gains/losses and show departures from the efficient case (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012) can be captured by the gap between an input and output share and domestic extensive margin elasticities. The loss reflects an endogenous selection of more subsidized firms into exporting. Using Chinese manufacturing data in 2005 and model-inferred firm-level distortions, we demonstrate that a sizable negative fiscal externality can potentially offset conventional gains.

We pose good markets frictions on top of an otherwise standard two-country international real business cycle (IRBC) model. Shopping for goods takes effort, which prevents perfect matching between customers and producers. An increase in search effort implies increased measured productivity. Demand shocks increase expenditures and search effort simultaneously increasing output, consumption, productivity, and the trade deficit and appreciating the real exchange rate. Thus we solve the Backus-Smith puzzle and we show that the cross country correlation of consumption is higher than that of output. Standard IRBC models cannot account for these puzzles along with movements in TFP.

Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long-term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited spanning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.

Emerging markets have experienced large human and economic costs from coronavirus disease 2019, and their tight fiscal space has limited the support extended to their citizens. We study the impact of an epidemic on economic and health outcomes by integrating epidemiological dynamics into a sovereign default model. The sovereign’s option to default tightens fiscal space and results in an epidemic with limited mitigation and depressed consumption. A quantitative analysis of our model accounts well for the dynamics of fatalities, social distancing, consumption, sovereign debt, and spreads in Latin America. We find that because of default risk, the welfare cost of the pandemic is about a third higher than it is in a version of the model with perfect financial markets. We study debt relief programs and find a compelling case for their implementation. These programs deliver large social gains, improving health and economic outcomes for the country at no cost to international lenders or financial institutions.

The US Great Recession featured a large decline in output and labor, tighter financial conditions, and a large increase in firm growth dispersion. We build a model in which increased volatility at the firm level generates a downturn and worsened credit conditions. The key idea is that hiring inputs is risky because financial frictions limit firms’ ability to insure against shocks. An increase in volatility induces firms to reduce their inputs to reduce such risk. Our model can generate most of the decline in output and labor in the Great Recession and the observed increase in firms’ interest rate spreads.