We examine the impact of the entry of new mutual funds on incumbents using the overlap in their portfolio holdings as a measure of competitive intensity. This simple metric delivers powerful economic results. Incumbents that have a high overlap with entrants subsequently engage in price competition by reducing management fees. Distribution fees, however, rise so that investors do not benefit as much from price competition. Funds with high overlap also experience quantity competition through lower investor flows, have lower alphas, and higher attrition rates. These effects only appear after the late 1990s, at which point there appears to be an endogenous structural shift in the competitive environment. We conclude that the mutual fund market has evolved into one that displays the hallmark features of a competitive market.

Using the relationship between institutional trades and sequential public information, this study provides a systematic way to identify institutional trades that are informative about future equity returns. By studying the US financial institutions from 1994 to 2016, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. The predictability of informed institutions is more evident for stocks with higher information asymmetry and in periods of higher profit opportunities. The informed institutions outperform the uninformed ones by 2% on an annualized basis and their performance gap is persistent. Importantly, the return predictability of informed institutional trades is not subsumed by the return‐predictive signals documented in prior research, computed either from institutional holdings or from financial statements. Further analyses show that the informed institutional investors derive their superior ability to forecast future stock returns from processing corporate fundamentals and acquiring private information. This study derives a novel return predictor using the institutions' proactive trading behavior and identifies various informational sources of informed traders.

We study competitive effects of foreign listings on U.S. stock exchanges over a 50-year period and show that U.S. rival firms respond strongly negatively (weakly positively) to foreign listings (delistings). The performance decline of U.S. firms is related to the competitive advantages that foreign firms receive from their cross-listings, such as stronger financial benefits, higher growth prospects, and better visibility, rather than market or industry valuation timing or existing market competition. This decline is especially pronounced when cross-listings come from proximate or developed markets. Our findings highlight an important role of international markets in influencing the performance of U.S. firms. Received February 19, 2019; editorial decision September 18, 2019 by Editor Isil Erel.

This paper examines the link between ownership concentration and corporate bond volatility. We show that more concentrated mutual fund ownership is associated with higher volatility of corporate bonds. This relation is stronger among more illiquid bonds, during periods of heightened bond market illiquidity, and among bonds held by corporate bond funds that invest in more illiquid bonds and experience higher or more correlated liquidity shocks. Using a sample of mutual fund mergers, we further show that increases in bond volatility are unlikely to be driven entirely by the endogenous ownership structure of corporate bonds. Our findings suggest that the concentrated ownership by corporate bond mutual funds provides another channel, apart from illiquidity, to help explain the excess volatility in corporate bonds.

This paper presents evidence that labor-saving technologies positively impact a firm's financial leverage. The results are robust with two different measures of labor-saving innovations: automation and process innovations. The effects are more pronounced in firms facing greater labor input rigidity, such as firms with higher labor intensity, share of minimum wage workers, and union coverage. Our analysis suggests that labor-saving innovations reduce wage rigidity, allowing firms to increase financial leverage.

We highlight an important but overlooked characteristic of financial fragility: “Fragile” stocks command higher liquidity. This reduces their sensitivity to corporate actions with price impact and affects the firms’ incentives to engage in such actions. We show that fragile firms have lower share repurchases, issue more equity, and invest more. We establish causality by relating changes in corporate actions to exogenous changes in fragility induced by mergers of asset managers. Our results suggest that financial fragility has direct but unexpected real implications for corporate actions.

We exploit the merger between BlackRock and Barclays Global Investors to study how changes in expected ownership concentration affect the investment behavior of funds and the cross-section of stocks worldwide. We find that funds with open-end structures and large exposure to commonly held stocks begin avoiding these stocks following the merger announcement. This leads to a permanent change in the composition of institutional ownership and a negative price and liquidity impact. We confirm these results in a large sample of global asset management mergers. Our findings suggest that market participants behave strategically in response to changes in expected financial fragility.

In contrast to the constant exercise boundary assumed by Broadie and Detemple (1996) [Broadie, M., Detemple, J., 1996. American option valuation: New bounds, approximations, and comparison of existing methods. Review of Financial Studies 9, 1211–1250], we use an exponential function to approximate the early exercise boundary. Then, we obtain lower bounds for American option prices and the optimal exercise boundary which improve the bounds of Broadie and Detemple (1996). With the tight lower bound for the optimal exercise boundary, we further derive a tight upper bound for the American option price using the early exercise premium integral of Kim (1990) [Kim, I.J., 1990. The analytic valuation of American options. Review of Financial Studies 3, 547–572]. The numerical results show that our lower and upper bounds are very tight and can improve the pricing errors of the lower bound and upper bound of Broadie and Detemple (1996) by 83.0% and 87.5%, respectively. The tightness of our upper bounds is comparable to some best accurate/efficient methods in the literature for pricing American options. Moreover, the results also indicate that the hedge ratios (deltas and gammas) of our bounds are close to the accurate values of American options.

Using the near universe of online job postings from 2007 to 2021, we construct a firm-level metric of labor market power. We find that firms with higher labor market power tend to have higher financial leverage. Our findings are not driven by product market competition or correlated labor market characteristics. The evidence is less pronounced among firms hiring in occupations with high labor mobility and skill transferability. To establish causality, we exploit the establishment of Amazon HQ2 in Crystal City as a shock to the labor market power of local firms and show consistent findings with our baseline results.