The rise of investments professionally managed with a socially responsible mandate has generated growing interest in environmental and social ratings. However, it is not clear how informative these ratings are or whether they are distorted by greenwashing. Based on the ratings of the leading provider, I offer the first evidence linking greenwashing to ratings inflation. Better ratings do not predict less future corporate bad behavior. This is of concern because it undermines the signaling value of these ratings. To understand these results, I develop a model where the rating agency may underinvest in greenwashing detection while firms have incentives to window dress and engage in greenwashing. Finally, controlling for greenwashing improves ratings predictive quality.

I study whether commercial banks' loan loss allowances were inadequate during the 2008 financial crisis because bank managers relied on low-quality information to estimate loan losses. To measure the quality of information collected on bank-held mortgages prior to the crisis, I create a bank exposure-to-mortgage fraud risk index (EFI) that captures overstatement of borrower income in mortgage applications. I find banks that originated more loans in high-risk neighborhoods had less adequate loan loss allowances during the crisis. My study is consistent with the hypothesis that fraudulent borrower information adversely affected banks’ loan loss provisioning.

This paper exploits an influx of Chinese students to U.S. universities from 2000 through 2018 to study synergies between banks’ deposit-taking and lending activities. Banks that are more recognizable by Chinese students experience higher deposit inflows and increase their local credit supply. This credit supply expansion only occurs in information-sensitive credit markets: small business loans and second lien mortgages. Such increase concentrates in nontradable sectors and is more pronounced at locations where managers have more autonomy. The results indicate that deposits from local consumers convey private information about the local credit market, which helps banks in information-sensitive lending.

Asset pricing predictions from the investment CAPM depend on the cross-sectional relation between investment and profitability. In samples of U.S. stocks featuring high cross-sectional investment-profitability correlation, both investment and profitability premiums are weak. Consistent with the conditional predictions from the investment CAPM, triple sorts on size, investment, and profitability as in Hou et al. (2015)’s q-factors resurrect the premiums in the high-correlation samples. We find similar results using cash-based profitability, consistent with the dynamic investment CAPM. Our work has important implications for constructing asset pricing factors and interpreting out-of-sample asset pricing test results, in particular the insignificance of historical investment and profitability premiums.

Players receive a return to investment that is increasing in the proportion of others who invest and the state and incur a small cost for acquiring information about the state. Their information is reflected in a stochastic choice rule, specifying the probability of a signal leading to investment. If discontinuous stochastic choice rules are infinitely costly, there is a unique equilibrium as costs become small, in which actions are a best response to a uniform (Laplacian) belief over the proportion of others investing. Infeasibility of discontinuous stochastic choice rules captures the idea that it is impossible to perfectly distinguish states that are arbitrarily close together and is both empirically documented and satisfied by many natural micro-founded cost functionals on information. Our results generalize global game selection results and establish that they do not depend on the specific additive noise information structure.

This paper studies informed trading about U.S. payrolls in the foreign exchange (FX) futures market. I find that speculators such as hedge funds are more likely to be sellers than buyers of FX futures ahead of good U.S. payroll news and thus appear to have earned significant gains around payroll announcements. In contrast, hedgers—in particular, dealers—appear to have provided liquidity to speculators. I show that mimicking speculators’ FX exposures around payroll announcements can add a large economic gain to various reference portfolios. My analysis also uncovers that information in FX trading is long-lived and differs along the U.S. business cycle.

How does the interaction of uncertainty and R&D impact corporate investment? We provide evidence that R&D significantly increases corporate investment responsiveness to PVGO news and uncertainty shocks. These results are consistent with predictions from the R&D-based real options model of corporate investment. To establish credible causal results we combine new measures of systematic and firm-specific PVGO shocks, for which we utilize stock price and option data, with exogenous measures of R&D capital stocks derived from panel variation in state R&D tax credits. We also rule out a number of potentially competing explanations for our results, including firm-level differences in lumpiness of investments, financial frictions, lifecycle growth opportunities or moral hazard-implied asset substitution or risk shifting.

A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively.

We first compare several measures of import penetration and find that total imports, tariffs, and exchange rates are endogenous, while imports from China are largely exogenous. Then we examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of U.S. firms. We document that Chinese import penetration reduces executives’ stock grants and wealth-performance sensitivity, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms.