We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers’ potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce disclosure to avoid crowding out informed trading, which can give them informative feedback for their decision making. In support of the managerial learning channel, we document a real effect of reduced disclosure: When managers disclose less, options trading has a stronger positive effect on firm investment efficiency. The more pronounced effect of options trading on management earnings forecasts when the need for managerial learning is higher further supports the learning channel.

Institutional cross-owners, specifically institutional investors with significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. In this paper, we investigate and find that the presence of institutional cross-owners facilitates a firm's financing of its investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing the adverse selection concerns of those who provide capital for the investment opportunities. We then examine the conditions under which the presence of institutional cross-owners is likely to more significantly reduce adverse selection and thereby have even more of a positive effect on the financing of investment opportunities. We document that relative to transient institutional cross-owners, dedicated institutional cross-owners facilitate more financing of investment opportunities. We also find that institutional cross-owners facilitate the financing of investment opportunities even more for firms with greater dependence on external financing, those with an opaque financial reporting environment, and those with more product market competition. Our paper offers novel insight into how a firm can benefit from the presence of institutional cross-owners.

We study the impact of CEO early-life disaster experience on stock price crash risk. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience have higher stock price crash risk. Our findings are consistent with CEOs who experienced early-life disasters being more risk tolerant, and thus more willing to accept the risks associated with bad news hoarding, engendering formation of stock price crashes. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of CEO disaster experience is amplified when a CEO has greater equity compensation-based incentives and power over corporate board to hoard bad news. Reinforcing bad news hoarding narrative, we also find that stocks of the firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience exhibit stronger asymmetric response to bad versus good news disclosures and are more likely to experience crashes accompanied by breaks in the strings of uninterrupted earnings increases. Further, consistent with early-life disaster experience making CEOs more risk tolerant, we find that firms led by CEOs with early-life disaster experience tend to have higher cash-flow volatility and stock return volatility. Evidence from supplemental analysis suggests that the impact of CEO early-life disaster experience on crash risk varies in a curvilinear manner with the severity of disaster.

We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.