I study how the disclosure of the liquidity coverage ratio mandated for a group of systemically important U.S. banks affects peer banks' liquidity holdings. I predict that the disclosure mitigates uncertainty about aggregate liquidity risk by providing insight into the likelihood of market‐wide liquidity shocks and specific sources of liquidity stress. This uncertainty resolution, in turn, reduces nondisclosing banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Using bank business interactions to measure the treatment intensity of the disclosure, I find that more treated nondisclosing banks cut their liquidity significantly more in response to the disclosure. In addition, the disclosure rule was followed by lower overall liquidity and a build‐up of systemic risk, indicating an economically considerable disclosure spillover effect in the aggregate. My paper reveals a new economic force, the spillover effect of mandated liquidity disclosure, that shapes banks' liquidity holdings.

T HE CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function derived by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow [2] has become widely known and widely used. Possibly the weakest point of the SMAC (Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow) formulation is the assumption of. . . the existence of a relationship between V/L (value added per unit of labor) and W (the wage rates), independent of the stock of capital [2, p. 231]. If this assumption does not hold, the value of the elasticity of substitution derived from the estimated CES function may be biased. The CES function is also subject to the limitation that the value of the elasticity of substitution is constant, although not necessarily unity. However, when the capital/ labor ratio varies, due to changes in the factor price ratio, it is possible that the elasticity of substitution will vary as the capital/labor ratio varies. The purposes of this paper are (1) to derive a more general form of the CES production function that does not depend on the SMAC assumption of independence and with a property of variable elasticity of substitution, (2) to examine the elasticity of substitution of the new function, and (3) to present some evidence of the desirability of using the new function.

Using exogenous shocks on the ability to issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), we show SEOs lead to a higher employee skill composition, that is, a lower (higher) proportion of low (high) skilled workers. The decrease in low-skilled workers exceeds the increase in high-skilled workers, resulting in reduced employment at the firm level. These effects are more significant when firms invest more in technology following SEOs and face greater financial constraints before SEOs, suggesting that SEOs relieve budget constraints on technology investments. These findings demonstrate that while external equity financing helps upgrade technology to improve productivity, it has a dark side for low-skilled workers.

We find the confluence of CEO-same industry experience makes independent directors particularly helpful in enhancing value-added growth and we identify a channel: guidance toward higher value-added R&D investments and higher quality innovations. Further corroborating these inferences, we find greater improvement in value-added growth when (1) independent directors with industry–CEO experience (IDICEs) have experience in more similar industries; (2) they create more shareholder value as CEO; and (3) they are current CEOs. In addition, IDICEs contribute to value-added growth most when firm environments and characteristics are conducive for active board-management interaction; namely, when product markets are more competitive and dynamic, when outsiders can more easily acquire firm-specific information, and when firms are younger and smaller. Consistent with our inferences on how IDICEs contribute to value-added growth, firms growing faster, less successfully innovating, and/or under strong governance tend to be matched with IDICEs.

This paper provides comprehensive, detailed documentation of major corporate governance reforms (CGRs) undertaken by 26 advanced and emerging economies. We investigate whether these reforms have altered investor protection (IP) and impacted corporate investments. Specifically, we estimate the CGRs' impacts on foreign acquirers' tendency to pick better performing firms in emerging markets. We argue the cherry picking is partly due to emerging countries' weaker IP than acquirer countries', predicting a positive relation between the degree of cherry picking and the gap in the strength of IP. Thus, if the CGRs strengthen IP, the gap will decrease (increase) following a CGR in a target's (acquirer's) country, moderating (intensifying) the cherry picking tendency. This is what we find when we estimate difference-in-differences in cherry picking before and after a CGR. These results not only demonstrate the important impacts the CGRs had, but also imply the IP gap between capital exporting and importing countries distorts firm-level allocation of foreign capital inflows and reduces the benefits of globalization.

This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We identify channels through which CEO ownership affects firm value by examining R&D, which is discretionary and risky. We find CEO ownership similarly exhibits a hump-shaped relation with R&D when EG is weak, but no relation when EG is strong. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues concerning CEO ownership and EG.

We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.

We examine whether industry product market conditions are important in assessing the benefits and costs of chief executive officer (CEO) power. We find that firms are more likely to have powerful CEOs in high demand product markets where firms are facing entry threats. In these markets, investors react favorably to announcements granting more power to CEOs, and CEO power is associated with higher market value, sales growth, investment, advertising, and the introduction of more new products. Our results remain significant when addressing the endogeneity of CEO power by instrumenting CEO power with past non-CEO executive and director sudden deaths.

The new accounting standard requires that financial institutions estimate expected credit losses on their loan portfolios. The predictability of long-term losses, however, remains an open question. We develop a model that predicts long-term loan losses and incorporates adjustments for macroeconomic forecasts. The model combines cross-sectional predictions with a high-dimensional dynamic factor model that tracks aggregate losses over the business cycle. The model predicts long-term losses out-of-sample with significantly greater accuracy than the Harris et al. (2018) model and several other alternatives. It is also more effective at detecting bank failures. We use the model to estimate the present value of expected losses and the expected loss overhang for a given bank-quarter. The estimated present values subsume information in reported allowances and in fair value disclosures about long-term losses; the evidence is also consistent with loss overhang distorting banks' decisions. The model provides a useful benchmark to study loan loss provisioning.