We present evidence that, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms responded to the increased requirement for outside director monitoring by substituting insiders with outside directors who have social or professional connections to their CEOs. This substitution was most significant in firms that have higher outside director monitoring costs – small, young firms, firms outside the S&P 1500 index, and firms with low analyst scrutiny. The addition of these “friendly” directors did not reduce firm performance, suggesting that it may have been an efficient response by firms aimed at lowering the additional monitoring costs imposed by the new regulations. Our findings suggest that, as with many other aspects of board composition, the determinants and consequences of appointing friendly directors vary with the costs and benefits of outside director monitoring.

We document that fund managers are more likely to allocate assets to firms managed by executives and directors with whom they share a similar political partisan affiliation. We find that this bias is not associated with improved fund performance. Funds with more partisan bias suffer from higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility than those with less bias. Partisan bias is more evident when fund managers are less experienced, in more informationally opaque firms, and when the U.S. president comes from fund managers’ own party. These findings suggest that political partisan bias among fund managers may be due to in-group favoritism.

We find that firms with CFOs who have extensive social connections within the finance industry hold less precautionary cash. CFO connections matter more than CEO connections, reflecting the preeminence of CFOs among C-level executives in cash management and negotiating access to corporate finance. Firms reduce the proportion of assets held in cash by seven percentage points in the two years following CFO turnover and the appointment of a CFO with finance industry connections. The stock market valuation of incremental cash holdings of firms with well-connected CFOs is lower than for other firms, consistent with investor recognition of CFO social capital as an alternative means to address constraints on external capital.

We investigate if prior professional legal education either restrains or increases the extent to which the insider trades of company executives and directors are informed. We show that executives and directors with legal expertise (lawyer-insiders) earn significantly lower abnormal returns than non-lawyer-insiders when they purchase their own company's shares. Purchases by lawyer-insiders are associated with lower future earnings surprises and firm profitability than those made by non-lawyer-insiders, and are more muted following months with high levels of SEC enforcement activity. Our results suggest that insiders with legal education may be more conservative in exploiting private information when making insider trades.

We examine how the partisan alignment between chief executive officers (CEOs) and the United States president influences corporate disclosure outcomes. We predict and find evidence that more partisan-aligned CEOs display greater optimism in their corporate disclosures. CEO partisan alignment is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast and issuing overly optimistic forecasts. More partisan-aligned CEOs also use a more optimistic tone in the corporate disclosure and exhibit a lower level of accounting conservatism. Our findings suggest that time-varying beliefs of CEOs formed by the political environment can shape corporate disclosures.