The leveraged buyout (LBO) boom of 2004 to 2007 was fueled by growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other forms of securitization. Banks active in structured credit underwriting lent more for LBOs, indicating that bank lending policies linked LBO and CDO markets. LBO loans originated by large CDO underwriters were associated with lower spreads, weaker covenants, and greater use of bank debt in deal financing. Loans financed through structured credit markets did not lead to worse LBOs, overpayment, or riskier deal structures. Securitization markets altered banks' access to capital, affected their lending policies, and fueled the recent LBO boom.

This paper investigates execution quality issues in corporate bond trading. Using an extensive sample of bond trades by insurance companies, we find that an insurance company entering a trade of similar size and on the same side for the same bond on the same day with the same dealer will receive a better price if the insurance company is a more active trader than if it is a less active trader. Trading with the dominant dealer or underwriter worsens these differentials, while greater transparency and smaller trading networks lessens these effects. Our results provide strong evidence that execution quality differences remain pervasive in corporate bond trading.

We examine how securitization markets affect the role of banks as monitors in corporate lending. We find that banks active in securitization impose looser covenants on borrowers at origination. After origination, these borrowers take on substantially more risk than do borrowers of non-securitization-active banks. We use borrowers' geographic locations to instrument for borrower-lender matching to distinguish the effect of securitization on the banks' ex post monitoring from its effect on ex ante screening. We further investigate direct evidence of banks' monitoring role by examining their actions following covenant violations and find that securitization-active lenders are more likely to grant waivers without changing loan terms. Our results suggest that banks exert less effort on ex post monitoring when they can securitize loans.

We analyze why firms use nonintermediated short‐term debt by studying the commercial paper (CP) market. Using a comprehensive database of CP issuers and issuance activity, we show that firms use CP to provide start‐up financing for capital investment. Firms’ CP issuance is driven by a desire to minimize transaction costs associated with raising capital for new investment. We show that firms with high rollover risk are less likely to enter the CP market, borrow less CP, and borrow more from bank credit lines. Further, CP is often refinanced with long‐term bond issuance to reduce rollover risk.

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.