This paper examines mutual fund families’ proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence that both exit and voice are important governance mechanisms when Institutional Shareholder Services recommends voting against management. Funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater insider ownership.

Previous studies have shown that high short interest stocks have low subsequent returns. We test whether the persistence of this effect is due to costs limiting arbitrage. The arbitrage cost that we focus on is idiosyncratic risk which, regardless of the arbitrageur’s level of diversification, deters arbitrage activity. Consistent with costly arbitrage, we find that among high short interest stocks a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic risk predicts a more than 1% decline in monthly returns. Moreover, idiosyncratic risk does not predict returns across low short interest stocks, and short interest does not predict low returns across low idiosyncratic risk stocks. Our results are robust to commonly used proxies for both transaction costs and short sale constraints.

Political pressures can bias public pension funds (PPFs) toward activist shareholders. The pension business ties mutual fund families (MFFs) have with portfolio firms can bias them toward firm management. We examine how these contrasting conflicts of interest affect institutional investors' proxy voting behavior and show PPFs (MFFs) are considerably more supportive of activist shareholders (firm management) in voting, even if doing so may harm investment value. The biases are more pronounced when incentive conflicts are stronger. PPFs support shareholder (management) proposals more (less) when Democrats gain more power in the fund's home state. Conflicted PPFs are particularly active in supporting value reducing shareholder proposals.

This article examines whether ties to portfolio firms’ management via pension business relationships provide mutual funds with an informational advantage. Funds become related to portfolio companies when fund families serve as trustees for firms’ employee pension plans. Selling by related funds is more likely to be motivated by an information advantage than their buying, because the latter is heavily influenced by the desire to secure pension inflows. We find that stocks with larger net sales by related funds experience lower future returns. Information appears related to firm fundamentals, as the return predictability of related funds’ selling concentrates in stocks with negative future earnings surprises. Consistent with an information‐based explanation, the predictive power of related funds’ selling for future returns is more pronounced when information uncertainty about the stock is higher. Our results contribute to a growing literature that shows the sources of informed trading by institutions.