ABSTRACT We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO's birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs' longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40.

We examine how public enforcement and private enforcement interact to contain self‐dealing activities in emerging markets. Using data from China, we find that firms receiving comment letters concerning related party transactions (RPTs) from stock exchanges significantly reduce their RPTs in subsequent years. We further find that (1) the subsequent reduction in RPTs is more pronounced when independent directors have higher career or reputation concerns and (2) independent directors are more likely to dissent or resign if their firms do not significantly reduce RPTs after receiving RPT comment letters, especially if they have high reputation concerns. Our study sheds light on a within‐firm mechanism through which public enforcement takes effect. Our empirical findings also illustrate how “sunshine enforcement”—maintaining timely transparency of the enforcement process—can significantly enhance the effectiveness of regulatory programs.

ABSTRACT: Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more optimistic in their stock recommendations when their brokerages receive trading commission fees from these fund companies. The relationship is stronger when the commission fee pressure is greater. The market reacts less favorably to the “Strong Buy” recommendations of analysts facing greater commission fee pressure. The funds also respond negatively to such recommendations in making portfolio adjustments. These results point to a source of analyst bias that has been little explored in the literature. Data Availability: The data are publically available from the sources identified in the paper.

ABSTRACT We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected, and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts, and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts' brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT We examine the relationship between disclosure of nonfinancial information and analyst forecast accuracy using firm-level data from 31 countries. We use the issuance of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports to proxy for disclosure of nonfinancial information. We find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error. This relationship is stronger in countries that are more stakeholder-oriented—i.e., in countries where CSR performance is more likely to affect firm financial performance. The relationship is also stronger for firms and countries with more opaque financial disclosure, suggesting that issuance of stand-alone CSR reports plays a role complementary to financial disclosure. These results hold after we control for various factors related to firm financial transparency and other potentially confounding institutional factors. Collectively, our findings have important implications for academics and practitioners in understanding the function of CSR disclosure in financial markets. Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

ABSTRACT: We examine a potential benefit associated with the initiation of voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities: a reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital. We find that firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year tend to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year and that initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. Further, initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage. Moreover, these analysts achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Finally, we find that firms exploit the benefit of a lower cost of equity capital associated with the initiation of CSR disclosure. Initiating firms are more likely than non-initiating firms to raise equity capital following the initiations; among firms raising equity capital, initiating firms raise a significantly larger amount than do non-initiating firms.

ABSTRACT We study whether sell-side financial analysts’ social ties to firm management help them discern firms’ financial reporting frauds and, upon such detection, how the connected analysts disseminate the information. Using unique data from China, we find that, although unconnected analysts do not manifest a significant change in their likelihood of covering the fraud firms nor in issuing more downgrade stock ratings, connected analysts are significantly more likely to drop coverage right after these firms’ first annual reports containing fraudulent information. Meanwhile, mutual funds with a trading commission relationship to these connected analysts (i.e., client funds) are significantly more likely to unload their holdings of fraud firms than nonclient funds after these firms’ first fraudulent annual reports. Overall, the evidence suggests that analysts with social ties to firm management have early access to bad news and choose to privately communicate the negative information to their clients. Data Availability: All data used in this article are publicly available.