We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perceptions about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perceptions are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.

[We develop a continuous-time model in which a portfolio manager is hired by a management company. On the basis of observed portfolio returns, all agents update their beliefs about the manager's skills. In response, investors can move capital into or out of the mutual fund, and the management company can fire the manager. Introducing firing rationalizes several empirically documented findings, such as the positive relation between manager tenure and fund size or the increase of portfolio risk before a manager replacement and the following risk decrease. The analysis predicts that the critical performance threshold that triggers firing increases signifi-cantly over a manager's tenure and that management replacements are accompanied by capital inflows when a young manager is replaced but may be accompanied by capital outflows when a manager with a long tenure is fired. Our model yields much lower valuation levels for management companies than simple applications of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods and is thus more consistent with empirical observations.]

We construct a sample of over 200,000 supply chains between 2003 and 2018 to conduct a chain-based analysis of trade credit. Our study uncovers novel stylized facts about trade credit both within and across supply chains. More upstream firms borrow more from suppliers, lend more to customers, and hold more net trade credit. This upstreamness effect in trade credit is weaker for more profitable firms and for longer chains. Firms in more central or more profitable chains provide more net trade credit. Our results are generally consistent with the recursive moral hazard theory of trade credit. Evidence for the financing advantage theory is mixed.

The average capital growth rate across firms declines sharply during a recession, and recovers only slowly. We provide a micro-founded explanation for this and several new stylized facts of investment asymmetry. Our investment model features various degrees of reversibility, cyclical macroeconomic shocks, and uncertainty about the state of the economy. Model simulations replicate strikingly different empirical patterns of capital growth rates at the aggregate and firm levels, featuring no slope asymmetry and a positive level asymmetry at the firm level, negative slope and level asymmetries at the aggregate level, and a positive relation between the industry-level slope asymmetry and asset illiquidity.

We examine the effect of private equity buyouts on the environmental performance of U.S. fossil fuel power plants. Output-scaled CO 2 emissions are, on average, 4.2% lower after buyouts, predominantly because of fuel-saving improvements in production efficiency. Emission intensities decline more significantly following buyouts backed by pro-ESG private equity because of not only greater efficiency gains but also enhanced emission control. Our results suggest that while private equity firms are effective at implementing environmentally beneficial operational changes that also increase profitability, they do not have strong incentives to undertake environmentally beneficial changes that are privately costly, except for those with pro-ESG preferences.

We examine the strategic role of cash in a two-stage competition model featuring a first-mover advantage in product markets and time delays in outside financing. Due to the joint effect of the first-mover advantage, time to finance, market profitability, participation cost, and the arrival rate of investment opportunities, large cash holdings can arise in equilibrium in both concentrated and diffuse industries, leading to a rich relation between industry concentration and cash holdings. The model also reveals novel interactions of these drivers of cash holdings that are consistent with empirical evidence. Furthermore, despite that cash is held to enable fast responses to investment opportunities, the correlation between cash holdings and realized investment is low. Our model provides an explanation for the large variation in cash holdings across industries and over time, and the strong correlation between cash holdings and R&D.

We examine empirically and theoretically the relation between firms’ risk and distance to consumers in a production network. We document two novel facts: firms farther away from consumers have higher risk premiums and higher exposure to aggregate productivity. We quantitatively explain these findings using a general equilibrium model featuring a multilayer production process. The economic force is “vertical creative destruction,” that is, positive productivity shocks to suppliers devalue customers’ assets-in-place, thereby lowering the cyclicality of downstream firms’ values. We show that vertical creative destruction varies with competition and firm characteristics and generates sizable cross-sectional differences in risk premiums.

We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perceptions about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perceptions are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.

We develop a model of performance evaluation and fund flows for mutual funds in a family. Family performance has two effects on a member fund's estimated skill and inflows: a positive common‐skill effect, and a negative correlated‐noise effect. The overall spillover can be either positive or negative, depending on the weight of common skill and correlation of noise in returns. Its absolute value increases with family size, and declines over time. The sensitivity of flows to a fund's own performance is affected accordingly. Empirical estimates of fund flow sensitivities show patterns consistent with rational cross‐fund learning within families.

We develop a continuous-time model in which a portfolio manager is hired by a management company. On the basis of observed portfolio returns, all agents update their beliefs about the manager’s skills. In response, investors can move capital into or out of the mutual fund, and the management company can fire the manager. Introducing firing rationalizes several empirically documented findings, such as the positive relation between manager tenure and fund size or the increase of portfolio risk before a manager replacement and the following risk decrease. The analysis predicts that the critical performance threshold that triggers firing increases significantly over a manager’s tenure and that management replacements are accompanied by capital inflows when a young manager is replaced but may be accompanied by capital outflows when a manager with a long tenure is fired. Our model yields much lower valuation levels for management companies than simple applications of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods and is thus more consistent with empirical observations.