A four-factor model with two "mispricing" factors, in addition to market and size factors, accommodates a large set of anomalies better than notable four- and five-factor alternative models. Moreover, our size factor reveals a small-firm premium nearly twice usual estimates. The mispricing factors aggregate information across 11 prominent anomalies by averaging rankings within two clusters exhibiting the greatest return co-movement. Investor sentiment predicts the mispricing factors, especially their short legs, consistent with a mispricing interpretation and the asymmetry in ease of buying versus shorting. A three-factor model with a single mispricing factor also performs well, especially in Bayesian model comparisons.

This paper examines how culture affects information asymmetry in financial markets. We extract firms traded in the United States but headquartered in regions sharing Chinese culture (“Chinese firms”), and we manually identify a group of U.S. analysts of Chinese ethnic origin (“Chinese analysts”). We find that Chinese analysts issue more accurate forecasts on Chinese firms than non-Chinese analysts. The effect is stronger among firms with less transparent information environments. Further evidence suggests that cultural proximity can go beyond language commonality and analysts’ pre-existing channels for information. Market reaction is stronger when Chinese analysts issue favorable forecast revisions or upgrades about Chinese firms.

We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance, but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front-loaded and stochastically decreases over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that incentives increase after good performance. Implications about managerial incentives and asset management compensations are discussed.

A four-factor model with two "mispricing" factors, in addition to market and size factors, accommodates a large set of anomalies better than notable four-and five-factor alternative models. Moreover, our size factor reveals a small-firm premium nearly twice usual estimates. The mispricing factors aggregate information across 11 prominent anomalies by averaging rankings within two clusters exhibiting the greatest return co-movement. Investor sentiment predicts the mispricing factors, especially their short legs, consistent with a mispricing interpretation and the asymmetry in ease of buying versus shorting. A three-factor model with a single mispricing factor also performs well, especially in Bayesian model comparisons. (JEL G12)

This study analyzes whether corporate financing policies of the US industrial firms have depended on borrowing costs during the last forty years. The results show that the impact is either zero or slightly negative. Even in the latter case, the results are economically insignificant. Overall, our findings suggest that firms do not adjust their capital structures based on interest rates, except when market participants expect that real gross domestic product growth will be negative. Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model, we show that relatively high leverage adjustment costs are able to explain the weak negative relation between interest rates and a firm's leverage. Our results are also consistent with the view that firms target debt-to-asset ratio rather than debt level.

We examine the effects of independent directors' external social connectedness on corporate fraud commission and detection. The results show that well-connected independent directors do not affect the likelihood of fraud commission but significantly reduce the likelihood of fraud detection given occurrence of a fraud. In particular, with a one-standard-deviation increase in independent directors' connectedness, the likelihood of fraud detection reduces by 22.5%. We also find that the consequences of fraud commission faced by firms with well-connected independent directors are less severe as fraud remains undetected for a longer period of time and fewer people are charged with fraud when independent directors are well connected. We further show that independent directors' connections to fraud firms significantly increase a firm's propensity to fraud commission and the likelihood of fraud detection is also higher. Overall, our results suggest that directors' personal networks have a “dark side”. Regulators should be aware of unintended consequences associated with directors' external social connections when considering how to prevent and detect corporate fraud.

Corporate executives managing some of the largest public companies in the U.S. are shaped by their daughters. When a firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) has a daughter, the corporate social responsibility rating (CSR) is about 9.1% higher, compared to a median firm. The results are robust to confronting several sources of endogeneity, e.g., examining first-born CEO daughters and CEO changes. The relation is strongest for diversity, but significant also for broader pro-social practices related to the environment and employee relations. Our study contributes to research on female socialization, heterogeneity in CSR policies, and plausibly exogenous determinants of CEOs’ styles.

We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes and is convex for medium outcomes and concave for good outcomes. We calibrate the model to data on 1,707 CEOs and show that it explains observed contracts much better than the standard model without risk-taking incentives. When we apply the model to contracts that consist of base salary, stock, and options, the results suggest that options should be issued in the money. Our model also helps us rationalize the universal use of at-the-money options when the tax code is taken into account. Moreover, we propose a new way of measuring risk-taking incentives in which the expected value added to the firm is traded off against the additional risk a CEO has to bear.

This study examines how financial disclosures with earnings announcements affect sell‐side analysts' information about future earnings, focusing on disclosures of financial statements and management earnings forecasts. We find that disclosures of balance sheets and segment data are associated with an increase in the degree to which analysts' forecasts of upcoming quarterly earnings are based on private information. Further analyses show that balance sheet disclosures are associated with an increase in the precision of both analysts' common and private information, segment disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' private information, and management earnings forecast disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' common information. These results are consistent with analysts processing balance sheet and segment disclosures into new private information regarding near‐term earnings. Additional analysis of conference calls shows that balance sheet, segment, and management earnings forecast disclosures are all associated with more discussion related to these items in the questions‐and‐answers section of conference calls, consistent with analysts playing an information interpretation role with respect to these disclosures.

This paper studies the cross-sectional risk–return trade-off in the stock market. A fundamental principle in finance is the positive relation between risk and expected return. However, recent empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Using several intuitive risk measures, we show that the negative risk–return relation is much more pronounced among firms in which investors face prior losses, but the risk–return relation is positive among firms in which investors face prior gains. We consider a number of possible explanations for this new empirical finding and conclude that reference-dependent preference is the most promising explanation.