This study compares and contrasts US and international accounting and financial reporting practices for cryptocurrency. We analyze the financial statements of 40 global companies that have exposure to cryptocurrencies, including cryptocurrency purchases, mining, payments, trading, and investments in ICOs and early-stage blockchain ventures. We document inconsistency between Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as well as distortions that can mislead users in assessing asset value, liquidity, profitability, and cash-generating abilities across firms. In particular, firms receiving cryptocurrencies in revenue-generating activities account for cryptocurrencies as intangibles using different measurement bases and classify the associated cash inflows differently. Some firms place cryptocurrencies in the usual long-term location of intangibles, while others consider intangibles as liquid, short-term assets. Limited guidance about crypto-assets from both IFRS and GAAP lets companies choose which existing standard to apply and how to apply it. Understanding the financial and valuation implications of these new virtual assets is vital for future accounting research and professional practice.

Relying on theories in which bank create private money by making loans that create deposits—a process we call “funding liquidity creation”—we measure how much funding liquidity the U.S. banking system creates. Private money creation by banks enables lending to not be constrained by the supply of cash deposits. During the 2001–2020 period, 92 percent of bank deposits were due to funding liquidity creation, and during 2011–2020 funding liquidity creation averaged $10.7 trillion per year, or 57 percent of GDP. Using natural disasters data, we provide causal evidence that better-capitalized banks create more funding liquidity and lend more even during times when cash deposit balances are falling or unchanged. Large banks as well as the top banks in Federal Reserve districts create more liquidity.

This paper analyses a model of strategic exploration in which competing players independently explore a set of alternatives. The model features a multiple-player multiple-armed bandit problem and captures a strategic trade-off between pre-emption—covert exploration of alternatives that the opponent will explore in the future—and prioritization—exploration of the most promising alternatives. Our results explain how the strategic trade-off shapes equilibrium behaviours and outcomes, for example, in technology races between superpowers and R&D competitions between firms. We show that players compete on the same set of alternatives, leading to duplicated exploration from start to finish, and they explore alternatives that are a priori less promising before more promising ones are exhausted. The model also predicts that competition induces players to implement unreliable technologies too early, even though they should wait for the technologies to mature. Coordinated exploration is impossible even if the alternatives are equally promising, but it can emerge in equilibrium following a phase of pre-emptive competition if there is a short deadline. With asymmetric capacities of exploration, the weak player conducts extensive instead of intensive exploration—exploring as many alternatives as the strong player does but never fully exploring any.

We use matched employer-employee data to study the role of the firm in the transmission of income growth into consumption growth. We find that growth in income relative to the firm average (the within-firm component) translates significantly less into consumption than growth in firm average income (the between-firm component). These findings are explained by the lower persistence of the within-firm component of income, better self-insurance for workers more exposed to variations in income growth from the within-firm component, and peer effects in the workplace. Quantitatively, income persistence provides 43% of the explanatory power, self-insurance provides 35%, and peer effects provide 22%.

Historical rice cultivation practices have shaped cultural norms that significantly affect households' risk-taking behavior today. Using national survey data from over 90,000 Chinese households and a quasi-experimental design, we find that these culturally induced behaviors, in turn, contribute to significant economic differences at a large scale. Our tests show that households in regions with a higher historical rate of rice cultivation are more likely to invest in the financial market and buy lottery tickets, but less likely to buy insurance. The underlying mechanism is that collectivist rice agricultural practices increase trust, social capital, and social connections, and even allow for societal members to borrow without interest. Additional tests show that our findings are not driven by regional economic growth, government-provided social safety nets, Confucian values, or ethnic diversity. These deep-rooted, ancient practices have important policy implications for leaders in collectivist cultures trying to rectify behavioral biases in household financial decisions.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high‐pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.

We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.

We estimate the effects of student loan access on educational attainment and labor market returns in New Zealand. We exploit the introduction of a national policy mandating a 50% pass rate for student loan renewals using a regression discontinuity design. Retaining loan access increases reenrollment for students around the threshold, and a majority eventually graduate with a bachelor's degree within seven years. We find that retaining student loan access leads to large labor market returns for struggling students. The additional debt from further borrowing is small relative to the earnings returns and declines quickly due to faster repayment.

We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.