This paper analyzes the major factors which determine the effects of taxation on the value of risky assets and on the cost of capital, and shows how the magnitudes and even the signs of these effects depend on the values assumed for a few key parameters in the model. Using plausible values for these parameters, it is shown that the results obtained are frequently counter‐intuitive.

We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade reporting started.

This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.

This paper studies economies where firms acquire capital in primary markets and then, after idiosyncratic productivity shocks, retrade it in secondary markets that incorporate bilateral trade with search, bargaining, and liquidity frictions. We distinguish between full or partial sales (one firm gets all or some of the other’s capital) and document several long- and short-run empirical patterns between these variables and the cost of liquidity, as measured by inflation. Quantitatively, the model can match these patterns plus the standard business cycle facts. We also investigate the impact of search frictions, monetary and fiscal policy, persistence in shocks, and returns to scale.

This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of payments to study the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on intermediation of private banks. If banks have market power in the deposit market, a CBDC can enhance competition, raising the deposit rate, expanding intermediation, and increasing output. A calibration to the US economy suggests that a CBDC can raise bank lending by 1.57% and output by 0.19%. These crowding-in effects remain robust, albeit with smaller magnitudes, after taking into account endogenous bank entry. We also assess the role of a non-interest-bearing CBDC as the use of cash declines.