We find that mortgage loans originated after the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD; a mechanism discouraging loan officers’ labor mobility) have a lower default probability, a higher loan modification rate, and a lower foreclosure rate. These effects are unaccompanied by any reduction in loan supply and contribute to more stable housing prices. Using the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as an alternative identification generates consistent results. Overall, our findings suggest that restricting loan officers’ labor mobility leads to better ex ante screening and ex post monitoring, improving the origination efficiency for U.S. residential mortgage loans.

We investigate the role of financial analysts in product quality failures. Relying on information about product recalls, we first show that analyst coverage on average reduces product quality, particularly when managers face greater short-term pressure from institutional investors. However, after identifying a subgroup of analysts who raise questions on product-related issues in earnings conference calls, we find that coverage by these “product analysts” enhances rather than compromises product quality. Firms with greater product analyst coverage are also more likely to retire low-quality products. Additional analysis demonstrates that product analysts help safeguard product quality by further probing into product-related matters and issuing more timely recommendation downgrades after firms announce product deficiencies. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.