Abstract Previous research on calculative intermediaries shows how these effectively challenge, distort, and disrupt accounting practices in ways that policy‐makers might not anticipate. The promises of surveillance capitalism—with its attendant data architectures, datafication processes, and technological sophistication—are different, supposing more accurate ways of reading individuals and greater calculative certainty overall. Yet there is little empirical research to explore how surveillance capitalism manifests itself at the organizational level, either conceptually or operationally. As a result, it remains uncertain whether such specters of omniscience are as haunting in reality as they appear in theory. We explore these themes by way of an ethnographic study into credit scoring in China, showing how intermediary organizations developed a multiplicity of credit scoring models based on machine learning and big data that differed both from original expectations and from each other. These different “renditions” of credit scoring suggest that the data architectures of surveillance capitalism are just as much subject to challenge and adaptation by intermediary organizations as calculative practices, such as accounting, are in more analog environments.

ABSTRACT Literature on equity analysts presents a conundrum: analysts are seen as influential market participants, yet researchers widely criticize them for their bias and inaccuracy. Studies drawing from economic frames struggle to explain this. Therefore, we develop a new conceptualization that positions analysts as actors operating in a social field. Drawing on a qualitative study involving 70 interviews with analysts and portfolio managers, we offer two broad insights. First, we identify long-term interpersonal and interinstitutional ties between buy-side and sell-side actors which contribute to social inertia in the field. Second, we illustrate how sell-side analysts’ social environment is dichotomous, pushing some to converge with consensus estimates, while encouraging others to diverge. Taken as a whole, our findings contribute to the accounting literature by enriching our understanding of the social and institutional forces that govern analyst behavior.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the ways in which sell‐side (SS) financial analysts seek to position themselves advantageously within the wider field of investment advice in spite of widespread skepticism over the value that their forecasts and recommendations add to investment decisions. The field of investment advice has been characterized in recent years by a number of regulatory and technological changes that have forced SS analysts to reconstitute the ways in which they influence the investment decisions of buy‐side (BS) actors. Faced with existential threats, SS analysts have responded to the disruptive impact of technology and regulation by struggling hard to ensure that their services are still valued by fund managers. Key to this ongoing process is the recalibration of professional expertise, which previous research has alluded to but not explored in detail. Central to the persistence of SS analysts in processes of investment decision making are activities revolving around the production and use of analyst reports which, our findings indicate, are less valuable for their informational content than their role as “relational devices,” ascribing legitimacy to SS analysts and earning them an entry ticket to more substantive, value‐adding interactions with companies and BS actors. We also show that economic considerations in the area of investment advice are influenced by social ties, the motivations of various actors in the field, and their relative position vis‐à‐vis other actors. More generally, we contribute to the literature on professional projects by showing how professional groups are constantly engaged in attempts to reposition themselves in the social space, but that field‐level changes can restrict the outcomes of these strategies to mitigation rather than advancement for the professionals concerned.