Abstract Many democracies operate consumer debt relief programs. These are often implemented or adjusted during the election cycle, but their political effects are not well-understood. We investigate if debt relief can influence high-stakes elections. We utilize quasi-experimental variation generated by a very large privately-funded debt relief program enacted in the Republic of Georgia during the presidential election in 2018 that affected every sixth voter. We estimate that the program helped the incumbent candidate win that election, and that its effects persisted. Overall, we show how economic power can translate into political power in a democracy.

We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other months in a sample of low- and middle-income countries. We hypothesize this is related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authoritarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditures, we show that within-household consumption of food increases in the days before elections.