We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms11In this paper “private firms” refers to listed non state-owned-enterprises, the ultimate controlling shareholder of which is an individual. listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.

We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO's birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs' longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation.

Prior research finds that auditors' social connections with their clients harms audit quality. We examine auditors' social connections with members of their clients' business community, a setting in which auditors' connections may improve audit quality. While social ties within a client's business community should improve auditor competency, they also threaten auditor independence. We test the effects of auditors' network connections on audit quality using data from China, where data on social connections and individual auditors are available. Auditors' business connections should be particularly beneficial in a relational economy like China, where clients heavily rely on social networks for contracting. We find that auditors with strong local business and government connections deliver higher quality audits as evidenced by fewer financial irregularities among their clients. Our findings are consistent with the improved competency that arises from auditors' business connections outweighing the potential costs of impaired auditor independence.

When emerging market firms disclose relationship-based transactions, they face a trade-off in which greater transparency may help lower their cost of capital at the cost of revealing proprietary information. We find that firms overcome this challenge by relying on analysts within their private networks (i.e., connected analysts) who, through repeated interaction with the firm, can better verify relationship-based transactions. Using Chinese firms, we show that firms with more connected analysts have more accurate consensus forecasts and lower forecast dispersion. When a connected analyst departs and stops covering a firm, the accuracy and informativeness of the unconnected analysts' forecasts decrease, suggesting that information spills over from the connected analyst to analysts outside the network. We find a potential mechanism for this information spillover: communication through common institutional clients, which suggests that embedded financial analysts—those sharing close connections with firms and analysts—serve as a channel for disseminating proprietary, hard-to-verify information. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; M40; N25. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more optimistic in their stock recommendations when their brokerages receive trading commission fees from these fund companies. The relationship is stronger when the commission fee pressure is greater. The market reacts less favorably to the “Strong Buy” recommendations of analysts facing greater commission fee pressure. The funds also respond negatively to such recommendations in making portfolio adjustments. These results point to a source of analyst bias that has been little explored in the literature. Data Availability: The data are publically available from the sources identified in the paper.

We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected, and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts, and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts' brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We compare the ESG ratings of MSCI, a global rater, with those of SINO, a local Chinese rater, to evaluate their effectiveness in capturing ESG risks within the Chinese context. Using ESG issues revealed in negative incidents as a proxy for ESG risk, we find that the ratings from the two raters often diverge, with SINO generally outperforming MSCI in predicting ESG risks in China. This divergence is more pronounced for firms with extensive ESG disclosures and when there are significant differences in how the raters define and measure ESG issues. Distance-based information asymmetry does not appear to play a significant role in explaining the performance gap. The advantage of local raters likely stems from their flexibility in tailoring methodologies to reflect country-specific nuances. In contrast, global raters adopt consistent methodologies to meet investor demand for comparability, but this approach may inadvertently reduce their relevance for capturing localized ESG risks. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

We study whether sell-side financial analysts’ social ties to firm management help them discern firms’ financial reporting frauds and, upon such detection, how the connected analysts disseminate the information. Using unique data from China, we find that, although unconnected analysts do not manifest a significant change in their likelihood of covering the fraud firms nor in issuing more downgrade stock ratings, connected analysts are significantly more likely to drop coverage right after these firms’ first annual reports containing fraudulent information. Meanwhile, mutual funds with a trading commission relationship to these connected analysts (i.e., client funds) are significantly more likely to unload their holdings of fraud firms than nonclient funds after these firms’ first fraudulent annual reports. Overall, the evidence suggests that analysts with social ties to firm management have early access to bad news and choose to privately communicate the negative information to their clients. Data Availability: All data used in this article are publicly available.