[We construct a dynamic multi-agent moral hazard model to analyze the interactions among the firm owner, the manager and the auditor. Moral hazard may arise in hierarchical agency because a rational monitoring agent may accept a side payment from the monitored agent for misrepresenting information to the principal. This multi-agent moral hazard problem is the essence of the concern for auditor independence. We show that a "low-balling" compensation scheme and the auditor's legal liability constitute an efficient dynamic contracting mechanism for hierarchical agency. In particular, low balling serves as a substitute for legal liabilities for maintaining auditor independence. Low balling reduces the transaction costs associated with the audit engagement relative to the flat-fee structure and can actually improve auditor independence.]

We show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post, they yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns. This suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent analysts in representing ex ante market expectations. We also show that forecasts of nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased, and produce forecast errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when independent analysts are following the same firms than when they are not. This suggests that the presence of independent analysts disciplines the behavior of nonindependent analysts.

Given the recent controversy over deviations of street earnings from GAAP earnings, we show that the nonrecurring items that analysts include in street earnings are more persistent and have higher valuation multiples than those items they exclude from street earnings. In addition, we find no evidence that the pricing differential between the included and excluded items leads to future abnormal returns. If, as analysts claim, the primary use of street earnings is to value a stock, then our results suggest that analysts do have expertise in processing earnings information and that certain items appear justifiably excluded.

We construct a dynamic multi-agent moral hazard model to analyze the interactions among the firm owner, the manager and the auditor. Moral hazard may arise in hierarchical agency because a rational monitoring agent may accept a side payment from the monitored agent for misrepresenting information to the principal. This multi-agent moral hazard problem is the essence of the concern for auditor independence. We show that a "low-balling" compensation scheme and the auditor's legal liability constitute an efficient dynamic contracting mechanism for hierarchical agency. In particular, low balling serves as a substitute for legal liabilities for maintaining auditor independence. Low balling reduces the transaction costs associated with the audit engagement relative to the flat-fee structure and can actually improve auditor independence.

We argue that if analysts’ objective is to provide the most accurate forecast by minimizing the mean absolute forecast error, then the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean earnings. Forecast bias is observed when the median is different from the mean in a skewed earnings distribution. Thus, part of the observed analyst forecast bias could be a result of analysts’ efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the earnings distribution is skewed. We find that earnings skewness is significantly related to analyst forecast bias. We also provide evidence that the market adjusts for part of the skewness-induced bias.

We empirically investigate the impact of financial analysts' integrity on their information outputs and career success. Using analysts' off‐the‐job behavior, specifically their legal records, to proxy for analyst integrity, we predict and find that weak‐integrity analysts engage more in opportunistic behaviors, including “speaking in two tongues” and earnings forecast walk‐down. These analysts obtain favorable management access and make more accurate earnings forecasts. Further analyses indicate that while the market as a whole does not distinguish weak‐integrity analysts from others, sophisticated investors discount their information outputs. Weak‐integrity analysts also experience less favorable career outcomes. Our results have important implications for investors, professional bodies, employers, and regulators.

Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more optimistic in their stock recommendations when their brokerages receive trading commission fees from these fund companies. The relationship is stronger when the commission fee pressure is greater. The market reacts less favorably to the “Strong Buy” recommendations of analysts facing greater commission fee pressure. The funds also respond negatively to such recommendations in making portfolio adjustments. These results point to a source of analyst bias that has been little explored in the literature. Data Availability: The data are publically available from the sources identified in the paper.

We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected, and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts, and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts' brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.