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Bank Interventions and Trade Credit: Evidence from Debt Covenant Violations

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2019 54(5), 2179-2207
This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.

Employee Inside Debt and Firm Risk-Taking: Evidence from Employee Deposit Programs in Japan

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2019 8(2), 302-347
Unlike broad-based equity ownership by employees, ownership of company debt by rank-and-file employees has not received much attention. We argue that company debt held by employees in the form of in-company deposits can monitor risk-taking and facilitate risk discovery. Employee deposits have been historically widely used in Japan. For a sample of 2,104 Japanese firms, using an identification strategy that utilizes a new law in 2003 that changed the priority of employee deposits in bankruptcy and led to large-scale withdrawals of employee deposits, we find that employee deposits mitigate firms’ risk-taking behavior and reduce the agency cost of debt. Received November 2, 2018; editorial decision May 1, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.