Auditing, Auditor change, Auditor change disclosure, Delayed hiring

The theory of stationary job search predicts that, controlling for other factors that affect the probability of leaving unemployment, duration and reservation wages are likely to be positively associated. The paper tests this prediction for British cross-sectional data from 1982 using an estimating equation implied by search theory. Simultaneity is crucial in the evaluation of this prediction, with single-equation and instrumental-variable estimates differing markedly. Perhaps surprisingly, given the extreme paucity of both job interviews and offers in the sample, the main finding is that reservation wages play a significant role in the determination of duration.

In this paper, the characteristics model of Lancaster is reconsidered. It is shown by example that equilibrium prices need not be linearly decomposable. It does follow that equilibrium prices must be a convex function of characteristics, however. Further, it is shown that this fact holds independent of the form of firm competition (e.g., perfect or monopolistic). Finally, the predictions of the theory are discussed in the context of two empirical examples.

In this paper, the characteristics model of Lancaster is reconsidered. It is shown by example that equilibrium prices need not be linearly decomposable. It does follow that equilibrium prices must be a convex function of characteristics, however. Further, it is shown that this fact holds independent of the form of firm competition (e.g., perfect or monopolistic). Finally, the predictions of the theory are discussed in the context of two empirical examples.

Researchers often restrict their sample selection to either December or non-December Compustat companies. However, no one has rigorously investigated the implications of this restriction. This paper compares financial characteristics of December and non-December year-end companies. December year-end firms are larger and have smaller betas as compared to companies with non-December year-ends. There are some strong industry concentrations in December year-ends, most notably in the regulated or recently deregulated industries. Retail sales firms have primarily non-December year-ends. A comparison of leverage ratios does not reveal a stable systematic difference between December and non-December year-end companies.

Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.

[This paper considers two questions: (i) what is the purpose of legal restrictions intended to separate "money" from "credit markets," and (ii) is such a separation desirable? It is argued that historical legal restrictions meant to achieve such a separation were designed to preclude the occurrence of sunspot equilibria. It is also shown that a coherent model can be constructed in which sunspot equilibria exist in the absence of legal restrictions, but not if money and credit markets are separated. Nevertheless, there is no obvious welfare justification for such a separation.]

Theory suggests that shareholders who own blocks of stock have a stronger incentive to invest in voting on corporate issues than nonblockholders. Our evidence indicates that institutional investors and other blockholders vote more actively on antitakeover amendments than nonblockholders, and opposition by institutions is greater when the proposal appears to harm shareholders. Our evidence suggests that institutions that are less subject to management influence, such as mutual funds, foundations, and public-employee pension funds, are more likely to oppose management than banks, insurance companies, and trusts, which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control.

This paper extends financial option theory by developing a methodology for the valuation of claims on a real asset: an offshore petroleum lease. Several theoretical and practical problems, not present in applying option pricing theory to financial assets, are addressed. Most importantly, we show the necessity of combining option pricing techniques with a model of equilibrium in the market for the underlying asset (petroleum reserves). The advantages of this approach over conventional discounted cash flow techniques are emphasized. The methodological development provides important insights for both company behavior and government policy. Promising empirical results are reported.