We analyze changes in unemployment, marginal labor force attachment, and participation in Canada and the United States using consistent measurement concepts. We show the importance for the comparative evolution of aggregate unemployment of changes in the fraction of those “wanting work”—the unemployed and marginally attached. We also study changes in the fraction of the nonemployed who are unemployed. Using micro data on labor market transition behavior at these margins, we find remarkably consistent results in the two countries, with the marginally attached displaying behavior lying between unemployment and nonattachment. The three nonemployment states are distinct in both countries.

In this paper, I develop a model in which risk-averse investors possess private information regarding both a stock’s expected payoff and its risk. These investors trade in the stock and a derivative whose payoff is driven by the stock’s risk. In equilibrium, the derivative is used to speculate on the stock’s risk and to hedge against adverse fluctuations in the stock’s risk. I analyze the derivative price and variance risk premium that arise in this equilibrium and their predictive power for stock returns. Finally, I examine the relationship between prices and trading volume in the stock and derivative. Received July 31, 2017; editorial decision December 3, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

[In this paper, I develop a model in which risk-averse investors possess private information regarding both a stock’s expected payoff and its risk. These investors trade in the stock and a derivative whose payoff is driven by the stock’s risk. In equilibrium, the derivative is used to speculate on the stock’s risk and to hedge against adverse fluctuations in the stock’s risk. I analyze the derivative price and variance risk premium that arise in this equilibrium and their predictive power for stock returns. Finally, I examine the relationship between prices and trading volume in the stock and derivative.]

This paper investigates the optimal monetary instrument in a New-Keynesian model with multiple monetary assets. We compare a standard interest rate rule to a k-percent rule for three alternative monetary aggregates determined within our model: the monetary base, the simple sum measure of money, and the Divisia measure. Welfare results are striking. While the interest rate dominates the other two monetary aggregate k-percent rules, the Divisia k-percent rule outperforms the interest rate rule. Next we study the ability of Granger Causality tests – in the context of data generated from our model – to correctly identify welfare improving instruments. We find the interest rate Granger Causes both output and prices at extremely high significance levels. The same result is obtained for monetary base and the simple-sum monetary aggregate. The test results for Divisia are the weakest as Divisia fails to Granger Cause prices. We conclude that if the choice of instrument is based solely on its propensity to Granger Cause macroeconomic targets, a central bank may choose an inferior policy instrument.

Human capital differences across countries can appear large or small depending on measurement methods. This Reply clarifies key assumptions and conceptual distinctions across accounting approaches. Accounting-based arguments for small human capital differences are difficult to sustain. By contrast, large human capital differences are theoretically and empirically coherent. Non-accounting arguments against large human capital variation are examined and their weaknesses pinpointed. This Reply also suggests a fruitful way forward for this literature, providing a natural conception of human capital that integrates literatures on ideas and institutions with the accounting of Jones (2014).

We construct Monetary Services (Divisia) Indexes at various levels of aggregation (the broadest of which is M4) from the late 1940s through 1967 employing methods designed to permit these historical series to be spliced to corresponding series currently published by the Center for Financial Stability (CFS), which begin in 1967. The annualized growth rate of our MSI M2 during 1947 to 1967 generally lies between the growth rates of conventional M1 and M2, while the growth rate of MSI M3 is below that of conventional M3 over the same period. Using spliced series, we find that the velocities of the MSI exhibit gradual upward trends from the late 1940s through 1978, with distinct upward shifts in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, while the velocity of conventional M3 trends downward between 1953 and 1982. Using a Fourier demand model, we find elastic substitution between M1 and the non-M1 components of MSI M3 up to 1967, but inelastic substitution between bank and thrift deposits.

In 1960, 94 percent of doctors and lawyers were white men. By 2010, the fraction was just 62 percent. Similar changes in other highly‐skilled occupations have occurred throughout the U.S. economy during the last 50 years. Given that the innate talent for these professions is unlikely to have changed differently across groups, the change in the occupational distribution since 1960 suggests that a substantial pool of innately talented women and black men in 1960 were not pursuing their comparative advantage. We examine the effect on aggregate productivity of the convergence in the occupational distribution between 1960 and 2010 through the prism of a Roy model. Across our various specifications, between 20% and 40% of growth in aggregate market output per person can be explained by the improved allocation of talent.

Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager's reporting bias or the manager's reaction to changes in audit quality. Our study provides theoretical guidance on these interrelations and how changes in the manager's or the auditor's incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality. Specifically, when the manager's cost (benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing the auditor to react by reducing audit quality. Because we also find that the association between expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. When the cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias. In this case, changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and accounting expertise on the audit committee. In light of our framework, we provide new interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.

Workplace wellness programs cover over 50 million U.S. workers and are intended to reduce medical spending, increase productivity, and improve well-being. Yet limited evidence exists to support these claims. We designed and implemented a comprehensive workplace wellness program for a large employer and randomly assigned program eligibility and financial incentives at the individual level for nearly 5,000 employees. We find strong patterns of selection: during the year prior to the intervention, program participants had lower medical expenditures and healthier behaviors than nonparticipants. The program persistently increased health screening rates, but we do not find significant causal effects of treatment on total medical expenditures, other health behaviors, employee productivity, or self-reported health status after more than two years. Our 95% confidence intervals rule out 84% of previous estimates on medical spending and absenteeism.